Research On A Three-Player Game Model And Policy Of Scale Breeding Pollution Control

With the increase in the scale of livestock and poultry breeding in China,pollution of livestock and poultry breeding has become a prominent problem,and it has become the main source of agricultural pollution in China,and the pollution control of livestock and poultry breeding cannot be delayed.In this thesis,according to the problems of waste pollution existing in the scale breeding,behavior evolution of scale breeding enterprises,local governments,and downstream farmers is studied by using system dynamics and evolutionary game theory.Firstly,the game evolution model composed of the three parts is analyzed,and the evolutionary process is simulated by the system dynamics model.The results show that there is no stable equilibrium point in the three-party game.Secondly,through the research of existing literature and analysis of models,an optimized dynamic rewards and penalties measure has been proposed.This measure makes the government's reward for the complete pollution control enterprises,the government penalty for incompletely controlled enterprises,and the enterprises' compensation to farmers all related to the probability of complete pollution control enterprise.The measure value the guiding effect of rewards to enterprises and the economic compensation of the affected farmers.And used the system dynamics model to simulate again.The results showed that not only the fluctuations in the evolution of the three games were effectively suppressed after optimization but also evolved to an ideal stable equilibrium point.And then through adjusting the parameters of the system dynamics model,we found that simultaneously improve the government's reward for the complete pollution control enterprises,the government's penalty for incompletely controlled enterprises,and the enterprises' compensation to farmers can make the evolution of the game system converge to a more ideal state.And reducing the cost of complete pollution control can also make the optimization result more ideal.Reducing the cost of farmers reporting enterprises will not increase the probability of complete pollution control,but it can shorten the time of the game to reach a stable equilibrium.Raising farmers' incentives to report enterprises have no impact on the game.Finally,based on the actual situation of the pollution from pig scale breeding in Jiangxi Province,this thesis proposes more targeted and more specific policy recommendations.