Dynamic Game Analysis Of The Effect Of Food Safety Supervision In China From The Perspective Of Regulatory Capture

Food safety is a major strategic issue related to the health safety of residents and social stability.There are a series of difficulties in the process of food safety supervision,and the supervision effect is poor,brings serious economic and social consequences,and restricts the sustainable development of economy and society.Local governments are responsible for regional food safety supervision,but their supervision behavior is susceptible to economic and political indicators,thus creating conditions for regulatory capture.The existence of regulatory capture is bound to distort the choice of regulatory behavior and make regulation deviate from the goal of social welfare maximization.Therefore,this paper,from the perspective of regulatory capture,USES the dynamic game method to analyze the strategic interaction between government regulatory agencies and enterprises under the background of regulatory capture,explores the impact of governmental regulatory behavior and food industry development on the regulatory effect,and proposes countermeasures to optimize the effect of food safety regulation on this basis.Firstly,by comparing the input-output data of China's food safety supervision in recent years,it is found that compared with the rapidly increasing input,the output of China's food safety supervision is not obvious.This paper analyzes the problems existing in China's food safety supervision from the three levels of legislative model,institutional model and operational model,and concludes that the immature legislation,uncoordinated institutions and inefficient implementation of food safety supervision are the institutional causes leading to the poor effect of food safety supervision.Starting with the basic game,this paper analyzes the dynamic game characteristics of decision-making between food safety supervision institutions and food production enterprises in China,and establishes the foundation for the dynamic game model of food safety supervision.Secondly,the main theoretical basis of the effect of food safety supervision is sorted out from the perspective of economics.The externality,public goods and information asymmetry of food safety regulation make it difficult to regulate the market effectively,which requires the government to take specific regulatory measures.The multiple principal-agent relationship in China's food safety supervision system and the policy burden of local governments lead to the phenomenon of regulatory capture,which makes the supervision deviate from the goal of social welfare maximization.Furthermore,this paper analyzes the influencing factors,and points out that the coordination of food safety supervision agencies and regulatory behavior are the core factors affecting the effect of supervision.Thirdly,the dynamic game model between government regulators and food producers is constructed to analyze how each factor affects the effect of food safety supervision by changing the strategic choice of both decision-making parties when regulatory capture exists.Based on the result of game analysis,select the corresponding index measurement model was constructed,using VAR model empirical analysis method,studies the influence factors of food safety regulation effect,after the regression results are robustness test,using the impulse response analysis to study the effect of a single variable received a shock to the system,and using variance decomposition analysis of each variable's contribution to the food sampling percent of pass of the variance.It is found that under the background of regulatory capture,increasing the intensity of food safety supervision has limited impact on improving the effect of food safety supervision.The regulatory reform fails to fundamentally improve the effect of food safety supervision;The development of the food industry itself will increase the regulatory burden of the government;The improvement of labor quality in food industry has a positive impact on the effect of food safety supervision.Finally,this paper believes that to improve the level of food safety in China,we should:first,strengthen the construction of food safety supervision performance evaluation system,and scientifically evaluate the effect of government supervision;Second,strengthen the independence of regulatory agencies,build a service-oriented government,and improve the status quo of "mobile law enforcement";Third,we should make rational use of information disclosure and fully mobilize social forces to participate in supervision.Fourth,attach importance to the construction of talent team,improve the innovation vitality of enterprises.The innovations are as follows: The dynamic game model that introduces the regulatory capture problem is applied.Compared with the traditional game model,it can better reflect the decision-making interaction between regulators and food production enterprises in the real situation.The conclusion is of practical significance.In addition,it is proposed that the intensity of food safety supervision influences the effect of food safety supervision through two ways,and the interaction of the two factors explains the reason for the fluctuation of the effect of food safety supervision from a new perspective.