Research On Pollution Supervision Of Agricultural Parks Based On Game Theory

With the rapid development of China's modern agriculture,the scale and number of agricultural parks are now increasing,and the pollution problems have also emerged.Pollutants in the agricultural parks will be discharged without treatment,affecting the surrounding ecological environment.If this problem is not resolved,it will inevitably affect the development of China's agriculture.Government departments have also begun to carry out targeted supervision of pollution in agricultural parks.However,due to short development time of agricultural parks,the existing supervision still has many problems,such as incomplete mechanisms and insufficient enforcement.Therefore,based on the current situation of pollution control in agricultural parks,this article uses game theory and system dynamics theory to analyze the strategic choices and influencing factors of both government regulators and agricultural parks.Based on the research results,relevant policy recommendations are made,in the hope that the cooperation between the two sides can improve agriculture.Pollution control efficiency in the park.First of all,the article sorts out the current pollution of agricultural parks and the corresponding treatment countermeasures,and finds out the characteristics of agricultural parks' pollution and the problems of their governance methods.Secondly,by constructing a complete information static game model with the government and the park as the main body,the returns are obtained.Matrix to analyze the effect of the strategy selection probability of the two sides under different conditions,at the same time,based on the actual situation of pollution control in the agricultural park,build an evolutionary game model of the two sides,obtain its replication dynamic equation and stable equilibrium point,explore the evolutionary relationship between the two sides,and The stability analysis of the strategy and the mixed strategy of both sides is performed;then,the evolutionary game model is simulated using system dynamics,and the simulation image is analyzed;finally,the government and the park are proposed countermeasures based on the conclusions drawn.The research shows that the cost of government supervision and the punishment measures of higher levels of government are the main factors affecting whether the government strictly monitors and the amount of government punishment is the key point affecting the standard pollution control of the park.Under the general supervision model,the government and the park do not have a stable equilibrium point.After the introduction of the secondary supervision mechanism,the strategic evolution trend of the two sides has stabilized in a short period of time.Under this mode,the park can actively control pollution and improve environmental benefits.The research results of this paper have certain significance for the pollution control of agricultural parks.