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Legal And Economic Logic And System Construction Of Regional Environmental Pollution Transfer Regulation

Posted on:2019-02-23Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H X WuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2381330590956394Subject:legal
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Regional externalities of pollution transfer are more serious than ordinary pollution transfer,but the traditional command controlling environmental regulation mode has exposed its limitations,especially in the area of pollution transfer process,because the environmental protection department set up the regional environmental regulation subject,type the command control environment regulation model proposes a bigger challenge.From the type,the regional environmental pollution transfer can be divided into four types: the diversion of pollution sources caused by unreasonable system design;Environmental pollution transfer caused by the migration of polluting enterprises caused by the influence of local government policies;Transfer of pollutants caused by pollution disposal costs;Pollutant transfer caused by natural flow in natural environment.On the existing management system,the regional environmental pollution of similar to environmental pollution control system,according to its theoretical basis can be divided into different "pigou into road","coase approach",and combined with the thinking and ideas of coase pigou composite regulation approach.Pigou road is a requirement that polluters pay for pollution control.The incentive model of "coase approach" is based on the improvement of the property right system.It is hoped that the externalities can be reduced without the government through the government.The composite regulation model has two ideas.To overcome the externality,we should take the way of pigou road.The key is how to achieve the most efficient private negotiation and optimal government regulation.The efficient externality of private negotiations is not unique but is defined by an efficiency region.The presence of asymmetric information about pollution damage and the benefits of the polluter is an important source of transaction costs.The optimal government regulation is difficult to obtain because of the information cost,so it can only pursue suboptimal government regulation.In the process of pollution transfer,the trade-off between output and environmental damage needs to be made.The main point of the trade-off is that the manufacturer has an incentive to overestimate the cost of decontamination when communicating with the control authorities.The system design needs to be carried out in three aspects: establishing a reasonable information disclosure mechanism,establishing a fair incentive mechanism,and taking public participation in the protection of property rights.The establishment of reasonable information disclosure mechanism,the information acquisition and information disclosure,the acquisition of information,both strengthen supervision and the incentive to overestimate the cost of decontamination.The disclosure of information depends on cooperation between governments across the region.To establish a fair incentive mechanism,a security and reasonable distribution of property right,need to expand and protect the public in substantive participation of the eia system,expanding the scope of the environmental public interest litigation litigation,ease restrictions on the main body of environmental public interest litigation.It is the construction of a complete and perfect trading market for sewage rights,and the other is to build a scientific and reasonable environmental protection subsidy mechanism.
Keywords/Search Tags:Pollution transfer, External effects, Pigou tax, Coase Theorem
PDF Full Text Request
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