Research On Incentive Mechanism Of Expressway Maintenance Contract Under Principal-agent Model

With the vigorous construction of the expressway in China since the new century,the expressway network in series between the East and the west of China has basically formed,and the highway transportation industry will also change from the development mode of long-term construction investment to increase the consumption of material resources to the coordinated development of maintenance management and transportation service.However,the research on the field of highway maintenance in China started late,the development is not mature,and because of information asymmetry and other reasons,there is a principal-agent problem between the owner and the maintenance contractor.In order to solve this problem,this paper applies the incentive mechanism in the information economics to the research in the field of highway maintenance,and designs a reasonable incentive mechanism for the owners to provide a reference value for the principal agent problem between the contractors.From the point of view of owners,this paper first studies relevant theories.This paper expounds the causes and forms of the principal agent problem between the owner and the contractor,analyzes the existing defects in the process of solving the principal-agent problem by the existing method and mechanism,and proposes to solve the problems by designing a reasonable incentive mechanism,and introduces the composition of the incentive elements,the incentive mechanism and the principal-agent.Through the analysis of the type of contract,we conclude that the contract type of cost plus incentive cost will be used as incentive contract carrier.Secondly,the design of dominant incentive mechanism based on multi task to improve the quality of expressway maintenance is studied.The factors affecting the quality of highway maintenance are identified by literature review and expert interview,and 32 specific factors are obtained,and 7 key factors are extracted from these factors through factor analysis in econometrics,and the key factors extracted are taken as incentive factors to the entrusted generation.In the incentive model,the explicit incentive mechanism model based on multi task to improve the quality of highway maintenance is built.Through the analysis of the relationship between multi tasks,the dominant incentive mechanism of the subjective and objective performance evaluation based on the Desgagne method based on the owner's design is finally obtained.Then,the design of implicit incentive mechanism based on the extension of expressway maintenance contract is studied.Assuming that the owner and the contractor sign a long-term contract,the two parties belong to the multi stage dynamic game cooperation relationship and build the incentive model of the owner to the contractor separately in two stages.Through the analysis of the results of the model calculation,it is proved that the contract which considers the long-term reputation incentive mechanism is superior to the long-term reputation incentive mechanism.Finally,through the method of data simulation and simulation,the influence of the parameters on the model results in the result of the implicit incentive model is analyzed.At the same time,the sensitivity analysis is used to get the sensitivity of the parameters,thus the design path map of the owner to the contractor is obtained,which provides the practical reference value for the owners.