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Multi-party Game Of Redistribution Of A Road Benefit Tax In The Second Apportionment Of Rural Road Construction Funds

Posted on:2020-01-04Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:M Z QiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2392330590452191Subject:Traffic and Transportation Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Due to the mismatch between local government financial and expenditure responsibilities and right of affairs,the unreasonable distribution of road benefit tax in rural road construction projects has led to the lack of financial resources for local government road construction,which has seriously affected the development of local government’s transportation infrastructure,which is not conducive to the region.Coordinated development.Especially in the case of e-commerce gradually developing into rural areas,a series of problems such as backward rural infrastructure and insufficient funds for building funds have gradually become the main factors hindering their development in rural areas.Based on the consideration of the value-added tax of the highway,this paper draws on the “factor method” to carry out the special general transfer payment method,and proposes the percentage of highway construction maintenance expenditure,the rural file upgrade task,the lower-level local government financial resources,the express delivery volume,and the number of stations.The size of the transaction is a "new factor" method that considers factors,so that the general government and the same level of local government can obtain special general transfer payments to make up for the vacancy of the establishment of funds,and also build the source of secondary allocation of rural road construction funds.The new structure of the source of the allocation: “municipal transfer payments at the municipal level + government transfer payments in the tax area”,and then build a multi-party game model for the municipal governments,infrastructure regional governments,tax regional governments and enterprises involved in the structure.According to the solution results,the following conclusions are drawn: the probability that the higher-level government chooses the joint transfer payment is inversely proportional to the amount of the separate transfer payment for the infrastructure area government and the amount paid by the tax-local government when the joint transfer payment is made,and the maintenance funds and information raised by the infrastructure of the infrastructure area.The cost of verification is directly proportional.Whether the government in the tax area chooses to strengthen supervision is directly proportional to the losses caused by taxpayers to fiscal taxes,and is inversely proportional to the cost of tax evasion.The probability of corporate violations is directly proportional to the cost of government supervision,and is inversely proportional to the incentives of higher-level governments and the losses to the tax-deprivation governments.With the advancement of technology,the cost of government supervision and management will become smaller.On the contrary,enterprises must pay more to make a profit.Therefore,the best choice for enterprises is not to evade taxes.Then,combined with the tax divergence of a certain city and district,the relevance of the road benefit tax,and the D-zone transportation fiscal expenditure and project construction fund allocation,the empirical analysis points out that the game is reasonable,and then the financial expenditures of all levels of government and under the different scale factors,the funds allocated by the two levels of government should be compared and analyzed.It is pointed out that the over-expenditure part is not large to the higher-level government and the tax-local government.The government’s separate transfer payments can share 2%-6% of the funds.When the value-added tax sharing quota of the two levels of government is exceeded,the optimal choice of the higher-level government is the joint transfer payment,and if the capital-based government wants to obtain the common transfer payment,it can implement the divergence degree as the transfer coefficient for the higher-level government.Taking the VAT sharing ratio as the method of sharing the coefficient,the proportion of funds transferred by transfer reached 20.6%,and finally the corresponding policy recommendations were given.
Keywords/Search Tags:Transport infrastructure, Construction and maintenance funds, Multi-party dynamic game, New factor method, Secondary share
PDF Full Text Request
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