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Research On Multi-stage Compound Excitation Optimization In Engineering Supply Chain Environment

Posted on:2021-03-14Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:M J LiangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2392330611468090Subject:Management Science and Engineering
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The construction of engineering projects is an important foundation for China's economic development,and the benefits of construction projects are the source of motivation for all parties involved.The improvement of the overall efficiency of an engineering project requires the joint efforts of all parties involved in the engineering supply chain,and the incentive mechanism plays a vital role in it.In traditional project incentive research,a single-level incentive for a multi-level supply chain on duration or quality is usually set,or a multi-level incentive for a two-level supply chain that takes into account duration and quality,or the model's ultimate incentive goal is to minimize the total cost.However,in the actual construction project process,on the one hand,the engineering supply chain is composed of multiple participants,and the action strategies of the participants are mutually influential;on the other hand,the control objectives are mutually influential.Increased costs and reduced quality;the enhancement of project quality will cause a corresponding increase in construction period and costs,so comprehensive incentive coordination mechanisms with multiple objectives need to be considered.This paper studies the compound incentive optimization problem of the three-level engineering supply chain.The main research work and results are:1.For the three-tier supply chain of project owners,general contractors,and subcontractors,consider two incentive measures,duration and quality,with the goal of maximizing revenue,replacing the traditional goal of minimizing cost,based on the principal-agent model,dynamic alliance and Douglas' production function theory constructs principal-agent models for owners and general contractors,and dynamic alliance models for general contractors and subcontractors.Through the internal correlation between the models,a three-level supply chain composite incentive optimization model was constructed.2.The three-level supply chain composite incentive optimization model is solved to obtain the optimal solution of the relative importance of the task,the optimal effort level,and the incentive level.The calculation and calculation program was compiled,and combined with examples,the influence laws of factors such as effort cost coefficient,risk aversion,uncertainty of exogenous random variables,and comprehensive technical level of the alliance were discussed.The research results can provide a reference for the project participants to determine the construction construction management behavior strategy.
Keywords/Search Tags:Engineering supply chain, Incentive mechanism, Revenue sharing, Dynamic alliance, Principal-agent
PDF Full Text Request
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