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Research On Supervision Service And Incentive Mechanism Of Engineering Project Based On Principal-agent Theory

Posted on:2021-01-18Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J WuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2392330632951608Subject:Project management
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China's construction project supervision system has been established since 1988 and has been implemented for 32 years.Through continuous reform and development,the construction project supervision system plays an indispensable role in promoting the development of the whole construction project.With the development of supervision system,some problems are gradually exposed.Due to the owner's lack of deep understanding of supervision,it is difficult to take effective evaluation of supervision work.The quality and level of supervision personnel are uneven,resulting in low overall service level and poor service evaluation.Therefore,it is very necessary to establish an effective service quality evaluation system for engineering supervision,establish standards for the development of supervision work,and combine the service evaluation results with salary design to encourage supervisors to improve service quality.Using the principal-agent theory to study the tripartite relationship in the project supervision service,through the construction of the supervision service quality evaluation system,considering the service quality in the supervision cost,and reasonably calculating the remuneration,so as to achieve the purpose of improving the supervision work level.Starting from the principal-agent relationship among the owner,the supervisor and the contractor,this paper analyzes and sums up the evaluation indexes,establishes the evaluation model of supervision service quality,issues the questionnaire survey,scores each evaluation index,and calculates the index weight by using the analytic hierarchy process.This paper analyzes the impact of service quality evaluation results on the remuneration from two aspects: the employer's remuneration to the supervision unit and the internal remuneration to the supervision personnel.There is information asymmetry between the owner and the supervisor.In order to reduce the risk and loss of the owner,the incentive mechanism is introduced to encourage the supervisor to work hard.The incentive reward is analyzed and designed from two aspects of explicit incentive and implicit incentive respectively,so as to make the service quality and reward equal.From the perspective of HC construction engineering supervision company,through empirical analysis,this paper evaluates the supervision service of a supervision company,and provides feasible suggestions for improving the quality of supervision service and determining supervision compensation.
Keywords/Search Tags:Engineering supervision, principal-agent theory, service quality evaluation, incentive mechanism
PDF Full Text Request
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