Research On The Influence Of Government Subsidies On The Adoption Of New Energy Vehicles And Social Welfare

The NEV(new energy vehicle)industry is an important strategic emerging industry in China.The development of NEV industry is not only conducive to easing the pressure of energy and environment in China,but also can cultivate new growth points for economic development.Since the implementation of the subsidy policy for NEVs in China,it has achieved certain results,but on the whole,the technical level of the NEV industry is not high,the scale effect has not been formed,and consumers have a strong dependence on the policy.With the development of industry and the change of market environment,the subsidy policy of NEVs has experienced many rounds of adjustment and improvement,and now it is facing the trend of reducing or even canceling the subsidy.The question worth studying is: What are the effects and mechanisms of various subsidy policies on adoption of new energy vehicles and social welfare? In this regard,what optimization measures should the government take to ensure the sustainable and healthy development of the NEV industry?In order to answer the above questions,based on the supply chain of NEVs,this thesis uses the dynamic game theory to build a decision-making model for multiple subjects including the government,consumers,retailers,NEV manufacturers and NEV battery suppliers,and conducts a theoretical study on the effect and mechanism of the NEV subsidy policy,so as to provide a logically consistent micro theoretical basis for optimizing the effect of subsidy policies.In the model construction,considering the phased characteristics of subsidy policy objectives,the thesis studies the impact of different types of subsidy policies with the policy objectives of maximizing market demand(i.e."NEV promotion and application" proposed in the policy document)and maximizing social welfare.The main research contents and conclusions of this thesis include:First of all,the thesis takes the maximization of market demand as the stage goal of subsidy policy for NEVs,assumes that there are two NEVs of high and low quality,considers the supply chain composed of NEV manufacturers and retailers,establishes a dynamic game model including the government,NEV manufacturers,retailers and consumers,incorporate industry scale and high quality development factors into model analysis,and two kinds of supply chain structures are considered,namely,competition without sales channels and competition with sales channels.The effect and mechanism of differentiated unit subsidy policies(including unit consumption subsidies and unit cost subsidies)and sales incentive policies are studied theoretically.The results show that:(1)the optimal unit total subsidy is determined by the unit cost of NEVs and the willingness of consumers to pay,and the distribution ratio of unit consumption subsidy and unit cost subsidy does not affect the subsidy effect.(2)The differentiated unit subsidy policy implemented by the government can not only improve the total market demand of NEVs,but also improve the consumption structure.that is,the demand for high-quality vehicles increases and the demand for low-quality vehicles decreases.With the improvement of consumers' willingness to pay for NEVs,the marginal effect of unit subsidy on improving market demand decreases.(3)Compared with the basic model without sales channel competition,when there is sales channel competition,the government can achieve higher market demand,supply chain profit and subsidy performance at the same unit subsidy level.(4)The government's sales incentive policy for NEV manufacturers can further improve the market demand of high-quality NEVs and NEV manufacturers' profits;only when the unit cost of high-quality NEVs is not too high,the sales incentive can improve the performance of government subsidies.Secondly,the thesis takes the maximization of social welfare as the ultimate goal of the subsidy policy of NEVs,assumes that there is only one NEV,considers the supply chain composed of NEV battery suppliers and NEV manufacturers,establishes a dynamic game model including the government,NEV battery suppliers,NEV manufacturers and consumers,and takes the endurance mileage of NEVs and enterprise R&D factors into account.Based on the analysis of the model,the effect and mechanism of the subsidy policy for unit mileage are studied theoretically,considering the independent R&D and cooperative R&D of NEV manufacturer and NEV battery supplier respectively.The results show that:(1)the implementation of unit mileage subsidy by the government based on the endurance mileage of NEVs can stimulate the R&D of enterprises,increase the market demand of NEVs and supply chain profits;when the basic willingness to pay of consumers increases and the unit cost of NEVs decreases,the effect of unit mileage subsidy is enhanced.(2)The amount of unit mileage subsidy implemented by the government is not affected by the basic payment willingness of consumers and the change of unit cost of NEVs,but is related to the R&D cost of enterprises and consumers' preference for mileage of NEVs.(3)When government subsidies are exogenous,R&D cooperation between NEV manufacturers and NEV battery suppliers can improve the endurance mileage,market demand and supply chain profits of NEVs.However,only when government subsidies are lower than a certain threshold,the profits of NEV battery suppliers and performance of government under cooperative R&D can be improved.(4)When the government subsidy is endogenous,the R&D cooperation between NEV manufacturers and NEV battery suppliers can improve the effect of unit mileage subsidy on the whole,but the change of government performance value is affected by many factors,such as R&D cost coefficient,consumers' mileage preference for NEVs and so on.When consumers' willingness to pay for NEVs increases and the unit cost of NEVs decreases,the advantage of cooperative R&D is more obvious.Finally,on the basis of the above theoretical analysis,the thesis puts forward relevant policy suggestions,namely:(1)The decline of unit subsidy should be scientifically studied and judged;(2)The unit mileage subsidy should be stable;(3)Accelerate the construction of charging facilities and improve after-sales service;(4)Market competition and R&D cooperation should be encouraged;(5)Policy flexibility should be improved.In this thesis,the prominent characteristics of the current subsidy policy for NEVs are included into the model for analysis.The influence mechanism and effect of different types of subsidy policies under the goal of maximizing market demand and maximizing social welfare of the government are studied,and the influence of channel competition,R&D cooperation and other factors on the effect of government subsidy is analyzed.The above content enriches the theoretical research content of the subsidy policy of NEVs,and provides a reference for the evaluation and optimization of the subsidy policy of NEVs at this stage.