Contract-based Incentive Mechanism For Mobile Crowd Sensing In Ubiquitous Power Internet Of Things

The ubiquitous power internet of things(UPIoT)is a concrete manifestation of the Internet of Things in the power industry,a product of the deep integration of the interconnected power network and communication network,and an important measure to realize the energy internet.The mobile crowd sensing can solve the key problem of high deployment and maintenance cost in large-scale perception networks,and has become one of the research hotspots in the field of internet of things.However,due to the selfishness of mobile users and the asymmetry of network information,the mobile crowd sensing network make mobile users unwilling to participate in perceptual tasks efficiently without any incentive,thus reducing the quality of perceptual data and the performance of the mobile crowd sensing,which will restrict the development of power internet of things.In order to solve the above-mentioned problems,this dissertation focuses on the research of the mobile crowd sensing incentive mechanism based on the contract theory.The main contributions of this dissertation are as follows:1.Aiming at the problem of moral hazard caused by the asymmetric information of the mobile crowd sensing network,this dissertation puts forward the design method of single task the mobile crowd sensing contract incentive mechanism in UPIoT.Firstly,a mathematical model considering the service platform and the mobile user’s risk preference is established by introducing the contract theory into the mobile crowd sensing network and combining the characteristics of the single-task mobile crowd sensing network in the power internet of things.Secondly,aiming at the selfishness of mobile users and the asymmetry of network information in UPIoT,the utility maximization of service platform is realized on the basis of satisfying the compatible constraints of individual rationality and motivation of mobile users,so as to establish the optimization problem of single-task mobile crowd sensing contract.Thirdly,to solve the above problems,we use Lagrange multiplier method and Kuhn-Tucker condition to get the optimal contract design of single task mobile crowd sensing.Finally,the experimental results show that the single-task mobile crowd sensing contract incentive mechanism proposed in this dissertation can effectively avoid moral hazard and motivate mobile users to participate effectively in perceived tasks.2.Considering that mobile users may participate in multiple mobile crowd sensing tasks,in order to avoid the huge overhead of single task mobile crowd sensing contracts,this dissertation extends the incentive mechanism of single task mobile crowd sensing contracts to multi-task scenarios.By introducing error covariance matrix and cost coefficient matrix,a mathematical model of service platform and mobile user is established under the premise of considering the influence of multi-task mobile crowd sensing.In view of the asymmetric characteristics of mobile crowd sensing network information and the compatible constraints of individual rationality and motivation of mobile users,this dissertation proposes a multi-task mobile crowd sensing contract optimization problem and its optimization design method to ensure the effectiveness of the service platform.Based on this,this dissertation discusses and analyzes the optimal contract design method of multi-task mobile crowd sensing in three special scenarios,i.e.,technology independence,random independence and double independence.The experimental results show that the multi-task mobile crowd sensing contract incentivemechanism proposed in this dissertation can effectively motivate mobile users to participate in multiple mobile crowd sensing tasks under the premise of reducing the utility loss of the service platform.The mobile crowd sensing incentive mechanism based on the contract theory can provide a new way to innovate the mobile crowd sensing mode,improve the quality of data collection and promote the development of UPIoT.