Study On Incentive Countermeasures Of PPP Pension Project Based On Evolutionary Game

In the last few years,The number of elderly population in China is becoming more and more dramatically.However,the pace of development of the matching pension institutions is far behind.The government pension institutions have insufficient financial investment,and the use efficiency of govermoment funds is low.The run cost of the private pension institution is too high and the profit rate is very low.The cooperation of public funds and social capital can achieve common responsibility and risk,and realize the maximization of social interests.However,The nature of the pension project is very special,the enthusiasm of social capital is not too high.The government departments should give some economic incentives to the social sector.Based on the evolutionary game theory,this paper analyzes the incentives for government departments to motivate social capital in the construction of pension projects.In this paper,the public and private sectors only have limited rationality as the premise,the government behavior assumption to cooperate and do not take incentive measures to cooperate for two kinds of incentives for private sector behavior is assumed to be actively involved in and to participate in the two,establishes the evolutionary game model construction of pension institutions under the mode of PPP,and the model analysis using replicated dynamic evolution mechanism,further through the simulation study on the morphological changes of the pension agency cooperation group game situation,has a certain theoretical significance of evolutionary game model for PPP,and according to the proposed incentive mechanism of pension institutions more perfect policy suggestions.Through the evolutionary game model and the Matlab analysis,the incentive measures of the public sector are the important factors that determine the good cooperation between the two sides.When the public sector to take a series of incentive measures including land support,tax incentives,credit support,and the public sector,private sector additional income is higher than the cost of additional income is greater than the cost,the initial state selection cooperation proportion is higher than the certain value,both sides realize benign equilibrium of positive cooperation;the public sector incentive to take high cost measures.It was enough to subsidize the private sector to private sector equilibrium absorption,;and when the public sector incentives for private sector additional income is less than the cost,the cooperation between the two sides will go bad or the bad equilibrium time.