Research On The Legal Issues Of State-owned Capital Supervision Under The Background Of "Management Of Capital"

After the Third Plenary Session of the 18 th CPC Central Committee,China's state-owned assets management changed from “management of staff,management of work,and management of assets” to reforms with “management of capital”.The proposal and promotion of “management of capital” reform made it necessary to separate and separate state-owned capital from operational state-owned assets.At the same time,it also required the focus of state-owned asset management to shift from asset supervision to capital supervision.This transformation is reflected in many policy documents issued by the state.The transformation requires the reorganization of state-owned capital investment and operation companies.The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council(SASAC)promotes the transformation of functions based on capital management,and separates the responsibilities of state-owned capital investors of the SASAC.The three-tier structure of the state-owned assets supervision system.The reform of “management of capital” is still in its infancy,and the state has continuously emphasized and highlighted the“management capital” element in the policy documents on the reform of state-owned assets and state-owned enterprises introduced in recent years.So far,there has not been a policy document specifically for “management capital”.With the advancement of reforms,the provisions of the state-owned assets supervision legal system conflict with existing laws,the content of existing laws is lagging behind,and state-owned capital supervision is new and old.The problem has gradually become prominent and has become a major obstacle to the reform of the state-owned capital supervision system.The main reason is the institutional dilemma,the state-owned capital supervision legal system is imperfect,the authorization of the supervision structure is unclear,the powers and responsibilities of the regulatory bodies are unclear,the regulators lack supervision,and the effectiveness of operational supervision is low.Therefore,based on the analysis of the state-owned capital supervision of Singapore's three-tier structure and the state-owned capital supervision of the separation of Italian government and capital,this paper uses the property rights theory,principal-agent theory and corporate governance theory in state-owned assets supervision to improve the legal system of state-owned capital supervision.The construction of state-owned capital supervision level system,the regulation of state-owned capital supervision subject behavior,and thestrengthening of state-owned capital operation supervision put forward the construction of state-owned capital supervision system.In addition to the introduction and conclusion,this article has four parts.The first part analyzes the general problems of state-owned assets supervision under the“tube capital” reform.Before the "tube capital-based" proposal,China's state-owned capital is not divided into operational state-owned assets,and state-owned capital supervision is included in the supervision of state-owned assets.After the "tube capital" was put forward,the state-owned assets supervision gradually transitioned to state-owned capital supervision,and the whole transition process was the evolution of China's state-owned assets supervision.The analysis of the theoretical basis of state-owned assets supervision can further explore the institutional dilemma of state-owned capital supervision and provide theoretical support for the basic ideas of state-owned capital supervision system construction.The second part analyzes the institutional dilemma of state-owned capital supervision.State-owned capital supervision is gradually separated from the supervision of state-owned assets.The state-owned asset management system with “management capital as the mainstay”is in the stage of deepening reform.Therefore,the old and new problems of state-owned capital supervision have been highlighted.The reason is the institutional dilemma of state-owned capital supervision,including the lack of both the regulatory system and the legal system.The shortcomings of the regulatory system include the unclear authorization of the regulatory framework,the unclear authority of the regulatory body,the lack of supervision of the regulator and the low effectiveness of operational supervision.The third part of the extraterritorial experience of state-owned capital supervision is based on the example of Singapore and Italy.Through the analysis of the state-owned capital supervision of the two typical countries of Singapore and Italy,and comparing the existing problems in the supervision of state-owned capital in China,the inspiration is pointed out in a targeted manner.The fourth part puts forward the specific ideas for the construction of state-owned capital supervision system.Through the analysis of the basic problems of state-owned capital supervision in the first part,it is clear that the time has come to adjust the state-owned assets supervision to state-owned capital under the “tube capital” reform,but there are still many institutional dilemmas hinder the realization of state-owned capital supervision.In response to these dilemmas,and drawing on the excellent experience of typical countries outside theregion,the specific ideas for the construction of state-owned capital supervision system were put forward.