The Dilemma And Solution Of Medical Trouble

Over the years,the medical crisis has become a microcosm of China's social contradictions.Although both the government and the hospital have made considerable efforts to alleviate this contradiction,the medical trouble has not been effectively curbed from the perspective of public attention and the frequency of malignant medical trouble.It is not an independent phenomenon,but an extreme situation in medical disputes,and an extremely emotional expression encountering medical damage.From the perspective of law and economics,this is not the result of rational choice,and difficult to regulate.Through the research,it is found that medical trouble in China is not only a behavior of losing control of emotions,but also a strategic of demanding high compensation in medical disputes,which is also the reason that contradiction of doctor and patient worsens further.From the perspective of cost-benefit theory,the reason why strategic medical trouble prevails is that it is a low cost,high yield option.Our government has made corresponding policies and laws to try to regulate this phenomenon,but it failed,and the reasons are quite complicated.Through the analysis of law and economics,the author tries to explore the essence,predicament and countermeasures of the problem.This paper is divided into five parts:First,a simple introduction of medical disputes and medical trouble that China's medical disputes in a normal level,but the medical trouble has become more and more intense signs.At the same time,an overview of the academic research results on medical disputes and medical trouble is made.It is believed that the academic often confuses medical disputes with trouble,and insufficient understanding of the particularity of medical trouble leads to the difficulty in realizing the solution strategies.In section two,the reason why medical dispute is often confused with trouble is that medical trouble is originally an extreme expression of emotional catharsis in medical dispute,and it can be said that medical dispute is the source of trouble.However,medical trouble gradually has the function of claim,and it is difficult to control.In order to clarify the correlation and difference between them,this paper analyzes it through the game theory analysis in law and economics,and holds that the reason why medical dispute prevails is that medical trouble behavior costs are low,but it can obtain a high monetary return.Thirdly,based on the theories of law and economics,rational man and bureaucracy,the author discusses why medical trouble has been worsening,while the government's governance has failed repeatedly,which is actually the result of high rationality.Under the background of China's medical system and bureaucratic system,both doctors and local officials will choose to pursue stability within their terms of office to ensure their promotion,while ignoring the long-term impact.As a result,the concept of "more trouble more compensation" is deeply rooted in people's minds,and the problem of medical trouble is trapped in a vicious circle.Fourth,under the background of bureaucratic system,the central government excessively pursues social stability,making medical disputes and medical disputes become the performance evaluation indexes of medical institutions and local government departments,and then the dilemma is aggravated by the rational choice of local officials and hospital executives.The countermeasures for the plight should also start from these links.The author puts forward four specific countermeasures,“banning non-liability compensation”,“strictly implementing relevant laws”,“establishing long-term orientation of the government”,and “reformulating the incentive system for officials”.The author found that the phenomenon of medical trouble in the society is becoming more and more complex,and even non-violent pressure means of claim appear.These behaviors will also deepen the contradiction between doctors and patients.The reason for the prevalence of these behaviors is similar to the claim-based medical strategy discussed in this paper,that is,the behavioral costs are low and the expected economic benefits are high.The author believes can be controlled by similar governance means.