The Environmental Governance Behavior Research Of Local Government In The View Of Game Theory

This thesis was written under the background of the governance for a series of environmental pollution events in Y city,Guangxi province.Assuming that the supply of environmental public goods in Y city were not achieving the goal of Pareto Optimality,and the main purpose of this thesis is to find ways to achieve this goal.Through empirical research,we concluded that in order to reach the goal,we have to solve the problem of supervision between the central government,the local governments and enterprises.According to model analysis,we can solve the problem of the prisoner's dilemma by an infinite number of repeated games.The premise is that punishments from the Central Government could be incredibly,information in games is symmetry,and the Local Governments could have enough patience.What's more,the cost of pollution control,penalty,supervision from the Local Governments has a great impact on those stakeholders strategies.To solve the problems in the case,this thesis has put forward 7 main proposals:the government of Y city should solve the problem of information asymmetry,innovating policy tools,carrying out the environmental performance assessment of public employees',improving the environmental pollution compensation system,making a good territorial space planning,normalizing environmental monitoring.