The Analysis On G2C Model Of E-government By Using Game Theory Under Government Information Disclosure Environment

The government information publicity is a universal system that various countries are carrying out presently。On May 1,2008, Regulations on the Disclosure of Government Information was officially promulgated and put into effect, which symbolized that government information disclosure in our country has developed into a new stage. The appearance of these regulations has identified government information disclosure behavior, raised government information disclosure efficiency, surly guaranteed the public people's right to know. Also, they created an institution foundation for building standard "flat government", and had important meaning for building a harmonious society.The paper begins by asking a question of should the state agency disclose government information?" and it starts with the present government information publicity situation, combining with the fact that public emergencies occurred these years, from the angle of economics, using game theory as the main method in analyzing and researching the issue of government information publicity. The paper aims to describe the present situation of government information publicity and point out the existing problem by construct a game model, and then bring forward some solutions on improving information asymmetry between government and public.From the background of government information disclosure, using the method of game theory, the paper carries on a systematic analysis research on the issue of government information disclosure. This paper contains five chapters. Chapter 1 is introduction, which expounds that why the writer choose the subject and research situation about it and research value and research method; Chapter 2 is background theories and their usability analysis, as discussion on supportive theories; Chapter 3 is to build and analyze the E-government G2C model by using game theory; Chapter 4 is to analyze the cause of game results that concluded from Chapter 3, almost qualitative analysis. Chapter 5 is to explore and search ways to solve the problem of information asymmetry between government and public by using incentive theory, and in this chapter, the writer points out that the way to improve the problem is to improve and perfect the incentive contract between government and public.