An Analysis On The Game Of Government Behaviors In The Adjustment Of The Industrial Structure In China

An outstanding problem existing in the economic structure in China for a long time is assimilated and a low level in the industrial structure. In recent years, China is in a key time for economic development. It is an apparent characteristic for economic operation to strategically adjust the lied industrial structure and promote development by the adjustment of structure. The course of the adjustment in the industrial structure is exactly that of the interest reallocation among various economic bodies. China has a vast territory, and the difference in resources endowment is much big. Regional government is not only the supervisor of local economy and social activities, but also the first body of regulation and control, who directly participants in some economic interests. When the central government adjusts and balances industrial structure, he must touch economic interest in every region. In order to uphold their local interest, the regional governments usually engage in various game activities with the central government, which forms barriers of regional interest and intensifies its assimilation and a low level. The central government should handle the contradiction between industrial structure policy and regional interest , and coordinate the relation between the entity and the party on the basis of honoring suitable local interest. Therefore, we must establish the model and the mechanism of interest coordination to ensure the thorough implement and entire fulfilment of industrial structure policy in every region by coordinating interest to adjust industrial structure eventually.This thesis divides into four chapters. Chapter I explains the present condition and reasonlessness in the adjustment of industrial structure hi China, and reveals the deep-rooted reason on the assimilation and the low level of industrial structure is that the regional governments pursue and uphold their local interests. Chapter II analyses the evolution of local governments ' function in the course of central government's administration decentralization in transition period., and closely study the effect on local economy and the behaviors of localgovernment by local interest in the adjustment of industrial structure.. The relation on coordinating interest is regarded as the premise to the coordinating of the local governments' behaviors. Chapter III introduces briefly the game theory and analyses strictly the behaviors of various economic bodies in the adjustment of industrial structure by game theory and models of game, on the basis of which we expound the necessity of setting up new coordination model and mechanism. Chapter IV puts forward essential coordination model of industry by the relative analysis of various industrial coordination models in west countries. The central government must establish two types of mechanism in coordinating interest-"interest-sharing mechanism" and "interest-compensating mechanism" owing to the failure of the contradiction coordination or regional interest in traditional system.