Research On Anti-Corruption's Impact On Credit Of Real Estate Enterprises

Real estate is the pillar industry of China's national economy.The availability of bank credit funds is of great significance to the stable and healthy development of real estate enterprises.Bank credit is also one of the areas where corruption is high.How does anti-corruption affect the availability of credit funds for real estate companies? In response to this problem,this paper uses 2009-2017 China real estate listed company from CSMAR as a research sample to examine the impact of anti-corruption campaign in china since the eighteenth National Congress of the CPC on the credit availability of real estate enterprises.The main research contents are summarized as follows:First of all,It makes an in-depth analysis of the impact of anti-corruption on the credit mechanism of real estate enterprises: the dominant position of the fund industry and the scarcity of bank loan resources constitute a breeding ground for bank credit corruption,and the bank regards the “rent” paid by the company as credit.Or an important identification tool for lending.The “corruption cost” formed by “rent” increases the financing cost of real estate enterprise bank credit.In order to reduce costs,real estate companies are more likely to meet the funding needs through direct financing,and on the other hand reduce the number and frequency of transactions with commercial banks by applying long-term loans.Credit corruption has reduced the proportion of credit financing for real estate companies and increased the proportion of long-term loans for real estate companies.Anti-corruption measures have a deterrent effect on corruption in the field of bank credit,reducing the“corruption costs”in the credit sector,thereby reducing the cost of capital for real estate companies to obtain credit.On the one hand,real estate companies are more inclined to borrow from banks to meet the demand for funds by issuing corporate bonds or stocks for direct financing.On the other hand,real estate companies also reduce the need to apply for long-term loans to reduce short-term loans.Reduce the number of transactions with banks to reduce the cost of credit funds,and some non-compliance long-term project borrowing channels are closed after anti-corruption,companies need to reduce financial pressure by increasing short-term loans.After the comprehensive performance of anti-corruption,theproportion of bank credit funds and short-term loans of real estate enterprises increased relatively,and credit availability generally increased.The impact of anti-corruption on the proportion of bank credit funds and the term structure of loans in real estate enterprises is different due to the nature of the property rights of enterprises and the degree of marketization of the location.Because state-owned enterprises bear certain social responsibilities and obtain invisible endorsements from government departments,the problem of financing constraints is not prominent,and the possibility of bank credit rent-seeking is relatively small;the problem of financing difficulties for private real estate enterprises is relatively more prominent.Credit rent-seeking is more likely.Compared with state-owned enterprises,the impact of anti-corruption on the proportion of credit and term structure of private real estate enterprises is more obvious.Compared with regions with high degree of marketization,the level of economic development in areas with low marketization is relatively backward.Private capital enterprises have fewer sources of funds,less accumulation of their own funds,and weak external supervision.Private real estate enterprises conduct credit rent-seeking.The possibility is even greater,and it is more obvious by the influence of anti-corruption.Secondly,we collects corruption cases of government officials or bank leaders who are involved in tribal horses.If the case disclosure involves bank loans,the real estate enterprises in the location of the case are set up as experimental group enterprises,and the rest are set as control enterprises.Taking the anti-corruption measures since the 18 th National Congress as an exogenous shock,the empirical hypothesis of this paper is tested by the empirical method of double difference.The empirical results confirm the establishment of the above theoretical analysis.Finally,we proposes to further affirm the positive impact of anti-corruption from the public opinion,accelerate the pace of market-oriented development in backward areas and further deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises,reduce the assistance to state-owned enterprises with poor management,and eliminate the market position of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises.Policy recommendations for the gap.