A Research On Performance Goal Setting Of Local Government Functional Department From The Perspective Of Incomplete Information Dynamic Game

The central government attaches great importance to government performance management,and hopes that through the performance management reform,the reform of the Chinese government will make breakthrough progress.At the beginning of 2011,the State Council approved the establishment of a joint meeting system for government performance management led by the Ministry of Supervision.In 2014,the central government has explicitly requested the central government to manage the government's performance management.Soon,performance management reform will be fully implemented at all levels of government and government departments across the country.Since 2012,the Chinese government has begun to explore the establishment of a government performance management system.Through the pilots in recent years,it has been found that government performance management is not only a lot of resistance in the process of promotion,but also seems to greatly dampen the enthusiasm of civil servants in the process of promoting government performance management.“Ghosts” such as “high target low setting”,“low target high setting”,“true target false setting”,and “false target setting” appear in the performance target setting process of government performance management.It is the existence of such "weirds" that have reduced the efficiency of government work and seriously affected the government's policy enforcement.How to solve the performance goal setting problem is the most important problem to be solved nowadays.Based on the status quo,characteristics,existing problems and causes of the performance objectives of local government functional departments,under the guidance of the two theories of goal management theory and game theory,this paper analyzes the goal setting process in government performance management.The problem of incomplete information dynamic game phenomenon,and analyzes the reasons for the parties involved in the game and its information asymmetry,selects the signal transfer game model that best suits the local government performance target setting,and analyzes how to balance the government performance target setting process.In the game of various stakeholders,the game strategy is substituted into the practice of Y city to verify its feasibility,and according to the game equilibrium,the game is proposed to balance the performance goals of local government functional departments.The government's performance goals for actual goal completion capabilities enrich the practice of local government performance management.After research,we have the following conclusions:(1)Through systematic analysis of the causes of information asymmetry in local government performance target setting,the adverse selection caused by the information asymmetry of the participating parties is not conducive to setting reasonable performance targets.(2)Through analysis,it is concluded that the participation target of the local government functional department is the upper-level local government and the lowerlevel functional department.Based on this,the signal-passing game model is used to analyze and obtain the equilibrium that can balance the two-party game.The signal transmission game model is substituted into the practice of Y City to verify its feasibility.(3)Under the equilibrium state,the two aspects of the target declaration and the target review are standardized to expand the information mastery of both parties,so that the higher-level local government can better supervise the lower-level functional departments to set up the government that meets the standards and is close to the actual target completion level.Performance targets,on this basis,propose recommendations for standardizing target reporting and target review.This article has seven chapters.The first chapter is the introduction.Firstly,the research background,meaning,method and ideas are described.Then,the current research situation at home and abroad is sorted out,and the related literature is briefly summarized.The second chapter expounds the theoretical basis of this paper,which is the goal setting theory and the game theory.The game theory is divided into refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium and signal transmission game model.The third chapter describes the status quo and characteristics of the performance targets of local government functional departments and the reasons for the problems.The fourth chapter uses the game model to simulate the participants of the performance targets of local government functional departments,and proposes three possible In the equilibrium state,the fifth chapter empirically analyzes the rationality and feasibility of the model and gives the analysis results.Based on the previous analysis,the author puts forward appropriate suggestions and measures.