Study On The Distribution Of Rights And Interests In China's Land Reserves

China's land reserve(or land acquisition and storage)system originated from foreign land bank system.In 1996 it was first piloted by Shanghai and developed in Hangzhou,Wuhan,Qingdao and other places.Later,it was extended to the whole country and is still in use today.However,the land reserve system that has been established in China for more than 20 years has failed to make effective institutional arrangements for the distribution of vital interests in the process of acquisition and storage.After the government acquires the right to the use of the land of the original land right holder,it sacrifices the interests of the original land right holder to a certain extent in terms of the standard for assessing the value of the land and the way of compensating the original land right holder,or simply applies the evaluation standard and compensation method of land expropriation or the local norms formulated have certain rationality in practice and operation and guarantee the interests of all parties,but they cannot be supported by clear and reasonable normative basis from the perspective of systemThe reason is that the land reserve system has some problems.First of all,China's land reserve legal system has the characteristics of "lower rank of upper law and vague provisions".After the legislative power is delegated to the local government level,this feature deteriorates into the defects of unsystematic,standard contusion and even conflict among local legislation.In the local laws and relations on land reserve of 11 cities in Zhejiang province alone,there are five different provisions on the distribution of interests.Secondly,there are still some problems in the process of acquisition and storage,such as the dislocation of local government functions and the ambiguity of land acquisition price composition.As a result,it is difficult to find proper theoretical support from the classical theories of property right,land rent and land development right in the norms formulated under the existing system,such as the market-oriented Shanghai model","governmentled Hangzhou model" and the "compromise model" adopted by Shaoxing.The author hopes to find a practical way out in the face of the chronic illness reflected by the interest distribution of land reserve system and the dilemma of dual interpretation of system and theory.Therefore,this paper puts forward two viewpoints: on the one hand,we should pay attention to the fairness of entities in the distribution of interests;on the other hand,we should make clearer and more effective rules for the existing land reserve system from the perspective of legislation.