Research On Incentive Mechanism Of China's Pension Institutions Under PPP Mode

With the aggravation of the aging in our country,the state has introduced a series of policies to solve the contradiction between supply and demand in China's pension services,the pension institutions PPP project is quickly picking up in this context.However,due to the government incentives and regulations are not perfect in PPP project,there are a lot of pension institutions simplifying service facilities and staffing,which caused a decrease in service satisfaction of elders and harm the public interest.This paper is based on this background,combined with the specific pension institutions PPP project,through using the PPP mode and incentive theory,starting from the opportunistic behavior which happened in the pension institutions PPP project,and making reducing the opportunistic behavior as a research goal,then builds a model which mainly considering government incentive and supervision and service management innovation of the pension institution between the public sector and the private sector.In the construction of the model,besides the factors that many scholars will consider in the research of incentive design,such as the proportion of public and private sector income distribution,risk preference and so on.Aiming at the actual operation of PPP model in pension institutions,the government subsidy factor often considered by scholars is extended to the incentive factor of combining government rewards and punishments for the supply level of old-age services,which is the reward and punishment factor.This paper improves the previous emphasis on positive subsidy and lack of penalty measures in model building.The model design will be closer to the actual operation of pension institutions.On the basis of analyzing the model,therefore,we find some key points that could help our government make decisions.This research concludes as follows.In terms of the optimal service management innovation efforts,if the unit subsidy on service management innovation for the private sector is greater than the economic and social marginal revenue,then the private's optimal service management innovation effort will increase with its perceived risk increasing.What's more,different from previous research is that the optimal service management innovation effort level changes with the different subsidies.In terms of the optimal income distribution,it is considered by the public sector in three aspects: the perceived risk for the two income,theservice management innovation efforts level of the private sector and the intensity of reward and punishment.In terms of optimal intensity of reward and punishment,when the increase in the economic and social benefit by the service management innovation is more significant,the public sector should increase the intensity of reward and punishment,which can make the private sector take into account the process of the service management innovation in pursuit of profit maximization.Otherwise,the public sector should reduce the intensity of reward and punishment,which can make the private sector devote more effort to increase economic efficiency and social welfare,but focus too much on the reward and punishment.