Government Behavior In The Reform Of Industrial Land Transfer Under The Vertical Constraint Mechanism

For a long time,local governments have attracted enterprises to form a "race" through low-price transfer of industrial land and other preferential policies,and allocated land resources with administrative power,resulting in the loss of social welfare.However,the "dilemma of collective action" makes the "competitive" development model with business environment as the main indicator lack of supply.In the reform of industrial land transfer in Zhejiang Province,the local government of Deqing County took the initiative to raise the price of industrial land and the restrictions on enterprises,trying to get out of the "race" dilemma.Why can the local government of Deqing County take the lead in transforming the mode of economic development? What is the logic of policy behavior?In order to answer the above questions,the article builds a research framework based on the “vertical constraint mechanism” and incentive mechanism as the theoretical basis.From the perspectives of provincial government control and local government behavior motivation,first of all,the policy tools adopted by Zhejiang provincial government to control local government industrial land transfer behavior are analyzed,and their effectiveness is analyzed.Second,the local government 's policy objectives for provincial government The motivation behind the differentiated response.An empirical analysis found that the provincial government's strategy of "receiving power" through technical means cannot achieve the goal of effectively controlling local government behavior.It is manifested in:(1)Centralization alone cannot improve the governance capacity of provincial governments to control local governments from going out of the "dilemma of collective action".On the contrary,the weakening of the power of local governments led to unsatisfactory governance effects.(2)Under the circumstances of weakened power and assessment pressure,local governments adopt flexible methods to respond to the control of provincial governments.By comparing the economic development status and local government policy behavior of the three local areas of Deqing County,Zhuji City and Jinhua City,it is concluded whether the external economic development has reached the "inflection point" from "competition" to "competitive excellence" It determines the path choice for local governments to pursue the goals of “economic incentives” and “promotion incentives”,which in turn affects the local government 's positioning of economic development methods.Taking the empirical example of industrial land transfer as an example,this paper verifies and supplements the research on power allocation and incentive mechanism in the theory of national governance: the agreement between the policy objective of the higher level government and the motivation of local government action is to solve "risk control" and "effective governance" Contradictory feasible path.The effects of "economic incentives" and "promotion incentives" on local government behavior are not mutually exclusive.The two influence the local government's decision-making under the influence of the external environment.