Non-public equity financing activities on the Internet are inseparable from the transmission of information between the investment and financing parties.Information asymmetry is a major issue between the investment and financing parties.The establishment of an information disclosure system can effectively alleviate information asymmetry.It is of great significance to help investors make correct investment decisions and prevent the "lemon market" and financial risks.Therefore,the author based on the characteristics of the industry,combined with the theory of information transmission to construct the information transmission mechanism under different modes,by studying two different operating modes under the Internet non-public equity financing,and supporting the design of the corresponding information disclosure system according to practical requirements.There are six chapters in this article.The first chapter is an overview of Internet non-public equity financing.Internet non-public equity financing refers to non-public equity financing activities conducted by financiers using Internet platforms.It is important to note that my country has clearly distinguished the two concepts of Internet non-public equity financing and equity crowdfunding in its legislation,and the two cannot be confused.The use of the Internet to carry out investment andfinancing activities is one of the prominent features of Internet non-public equity financing that distinguishes it from traditional financing activities.At the same time,it also has certain restrictions on the access standards and number of investors.It is strictly forbidden to illegally use Internet non-public equity financing.Currently,there are three different types of non-public equity financing activities on the Internet,namely,equity,membership,and voucher type.However,in the early stage of my country's voucher-based Internet non-public equity financing activities,Micro Media was halted by the regulatory authorities during the fundraising process.At present,there is no institution that specializes in certificate-based Internet non-public equity financing.The second chapter of this article introduces the different operating models of the platform,the Internet non-public equity financing model,and the necessity of designing an information disclosure system based on the characteristics of different financing models.Different platform operation models affect the role positioning of platform operators in investment and financing activities.Platforms that adopt equity returns can obtain part of the equity from the target project and obtain benefits through the appreciation of equity.Under this model,the profit of the platform is affected by The performance impact of investment and financing activities is related to the interests of the financing party,which in turn affects the fairness and objectivity of platform information disclosure supervision.Therefore,the platform party should avoid interest associations with the target project in the supervision process,nor can it provide investors with consulting suggestions and interfere with their investment decisions.There are two modes of non-public equity financing on the Internet: a fast joint investment model and a lead investment-following investment model.There are certain differences in the transmission of information under different investment and financing modes.In the fast joint investment mode,information is invested and financed by platform operators The two parties communicate with each other,so the role of the platform is particularly important.There is a view that platform operators only exist as intermediaries and their legal status is similar to that of intermediaries.They only provide platforms for financiers to release information and providechannels for investors to obtain information.This model naturally weakens the supervisory responsibilities of platform operators,especially It is the duty to review the information released by financiers.In practice,there are also court judgments that determine the legal status of the platform operator as an intermediary,but at the same time,the judgment also shows that the conclusion of the determination is only made for individual cases and does not have wide applicability.The author believes that the platform under the fast co-investment model should have multiple functions of intermediary and supervision.While providing an information transmission platform as an intermediary,it also has supervisory duties and information review obligations.At the same time,the platform under this model should be strictly prohibited from adopting equity the return-based or value-added service-based profit model prevents the platform from becoming a stakeholder and affecting the neutral position of the platform party.The platform party should play its role as a "gatekeeper".Different from the fast co-investment model,the lead investor plays a central role in the information transmission process under the lead investment-following investment model.The lead investor is the main investor of the target project and also the project solicitor of the financier,and may even be the source of the project information,so the influence of the lead investor is an important consideration in the design of the information disclosure system under this model.The lead investor endorses the credit of the enterprise in the process of project financing and solicits projects for investors.It has an advantage over ordinary investors in obtaining project information,especially for financing activities carried out by limited partnership.As a general partner of a limited partnership,he can directly approach the financiers on behalf of investors,and lead investors can also actively follow up the progress of the project on behalf of investors,and even participate in the daily business decisions of the financiers,making it easier to obtain effective information.In addition,the lead investors certified by the platform are often industry professionals with high professional quality and strong anti-risk ability.Their ability to identify and screen information is stronger than that of ordinary investors.Therefore,the lead investment-follow-up investment model should be biased towards strengthening theleadership.Investors' information disclosure obligations,while taking into account the particularity of limited partnerships,adopting more flexible information disclosure methods,etc.The third chapter of this article introduces the current situation of my country's Internet non-public equity financing information disclosure,and analyzes the risks of investors under the current information disclosure situation.At present,there are no clear regulations on the information disclosure obligations and disclosure requirements of non-public equity financing on the Internet in my country.In practice,the platform is usually autonomous.The author selects three representative platforms that adopt the lead investor model and the fast co-investment model from more than one hundred existing platforms in China.Through studying the platform disclosure rules issued by them,I found that different platforms have different requirements for information disclosure.1.The degree of lenient and strictness is different,and platform operators who are the main body of rulemaking tend to weaken their review obligations.For example,it is stated in the disclosure rules that the platform is not responsible for the authenticity and legitimacy of the information published,which in fact will all Information risk is passed on to investors.In addition,the platform rules lack specific punitive provisions on how to deal with financing parties who release false information or refuse to release information,and they are not compulsory.As a result,platform operators are often helpless in the face of the untrustworthiness of violators.Chapter 4 of this article is a comparative study on the information disclosure system of non-public equity financing on the Internet outside the territory.Unlike our country,the United States and the United Kingdom did not subdivide Internet equity financing into equity crowdfunding and Internet non-public equity financing,but collectively referred to as equity crowdfunding.The US information disclosure system is designed to be both leniency and strict,the content is scientific and reasonable,the requirements are clear and specific,and it has practical operational value;in addition to general regulations,the UK also places more emphasis on the information disclosure obligations and audit obligations of crowdfunding platforms asthe subject of obligations,for investors Making investment decisions provides a double guarantee;Japan has stricter requirements on the content of disclosure,but its disclosure requirements are loose.Although the United States,Britain,and Japan are different from my country's national conditions,their advanced experience in the design of information disclosure rules still has a certain reference value for my country.Chapter 5 of this article introduces the author's suggestions on the design of the information disclosure system under the two industrial operating modes of lead investment-follow investment and fast co-investment.In Internet non-public equity financing,investors' capital scale and investment amount are limited,and they cannot use their own advantages to force financiers to actively and actively disclose information.In particular,the project quality signal transmitted by financiers in the fast joint investment model directly faces investors.Therefore,the author believes that the “gatekeeper” role of the platform should be strengthened in the design of its system,and the platform's supervisory responsibilities and audit obligations should be strengthened.While emphasizing the platform's substantive audit obligations,it should extend its audit obligations to a certain extent to encourage the platform to collaborate with third parties Professional institutions review and issue reports on the operability of the project's funding cycle,risk assessment,etc.,and at the same time reduce conflicts of interest by restricting the platform's profit model,ensuring neutrality,and standardizing platform project management responsibilities.Under the lead investor-follow investment model,the influence of the lead investor should be included in the design of the information disclosure system,emphasizing its core position in information transmission,on the one hand,clarify the lead investor's information disclosure obligations,and increase the lead investor's dishonesty Disciplinary responsibility to protect investors' double right to know;on the other hand,flexible information disclosure methods are adopted to reduce project disclosure costs under the limited partnership model.In order to protect investors' right to know in the post-investment management stage,lead investors should be urged to be active at this stage Perform supervisory duties,actively participate in the projectdecision-making of the financing party,grasp the progress of the project as soon as possible and give feedback to investors. |