Decision Rules Of Individual Cooperative Behavior And Its Incentive Mechanism

How can cooperation be possible? This is the core problem of the economic theory and the operation of the real society.The main work of this paper include: first,to study the evolution rules of three typical social network topological structure of cooperation,which is more conducive to cooperation;second,introduce network size,initial probability,defection-award,neighbor node selection,to study the interaction rules,the variables that how to affect the occurrence and maintenance of cooperation;third,based on the above two aspects,compare the different evolution results,discusses how to design an effective incentive mechanism to maintain and promote cooperation.Try to provide some reference for the design of effective incentive mechanism "how to promote cooperation".The simulation of evolutionary game is carried out by using the modeling method based on the behavior subject.Using the NetLogo simulation platform that is currently used in interdisciplinary research,we build three typical social networks,design simulation experiments,and do several sets of experiments by changing parameter values,comparing and analyzing the simulation results.The study found that:In a regular-lattice-network structure,betrayal benefits have a significant impact on the evolutionary results.When the rebate returns are low enough,the group cooperation can always occur regardless of the initial cooperation probability.When the profit of betrayal is large enough,the group tends to choose not to cooperate all the choice;when the rebate income is in the middle value,it does not exist in the state of evolution equilibrium.When the individual strategy is introduced and the other player's strategy is compared,the speed of evolution will be accelerated.In scale free network structure,even if the value of betrayal is higher than the value of cooperative income,if the initial cooperation probability is small,the group can also evolve into all betrayal state.When the probability of initial cooperation is higher,the group is more likely to evolve into a cooperative group.With the same initial cooperation probability,with the increase of betrayal,the group will be more likely to evolve into a betrayal.When the evolution strategy is changed,there will be a steady state of coexistence of some collaborators and betrayals.Compared with regular-lattice-network and small world network,scale-free networks is more conducive to the evolution of cooperation.In the small world network structure,when the return value is less than the betrayal of cooperation income value,even if there are few partners,may also make the cooperation strategy of group selection and betrayal,occupy the absolute advantage;in the case of a relatively small defection-award,improve the initial cooperation probability,will make the group toward the evolution of cooperation.The increase in defection-award will speed up the speed of evolution and reach the equilibrium point faster.In this experiment,the regular-lattice network and the small world network have more commonality.Compared with regular-lattice-network of and small world network,scalefree network is more conducive to the evolution of cooperation,which is the result of the structure of the network.In conclusion,there are many factors related to the evolution of group cooperation,including the size of network,the probability of initial cooperation,the size of the defection-award,the way of neighbor selection,the interaction rules,and the network structure of individuals.When designing incentive mechanism,we should give full consideration to factors such as social network structure,initial cooperation probability and defection-award,so as to develop effective incentive mechanism and promote cooperation to happen and maintain.