Study On Logistics Service Supply Chain Contracts Considering Fairness Concerns

Logistics service supply chain(LSSC)is a new type of supply chain by providing flexible logistics services so as to ensure the logistics operation of product supply chain.Due to the invisibility,synchronicity and hard to storage characteristic of logistics service,the management of LSSC is even more challenging than the traditional supply chain.Therefore,in order to improve the performance of the whole LSSC,how to disperse the risk of LSSC to further realize effective collaboration between LSSC members is an important research topic in the reality.Most of the studies about supply chain contracts are based on the assumption that decision makers are completely rational.However,in recent years,a series of game experiments have demonstrated that decision makers are fairness-concerned.In view of this,it is necessary to introduce the fairness concern behavior into the study of LSSC in order to make decision results more accurate and effective.Based on the existing studies of LSSC contracts,this thesis took integrator's fairness concern behavior into consideration and considered various costs,deeply studied the problem of the LSSC contracts considering fairness concerns.The main research work includes the following four aspects:(1)Studied LSSC wholesale price contract model considering fairness concerns behavior.Firstly,analyzed the traditional LSSC wholesale price contract model;Secondly,by reference to related literature,this thesis put forward the utility function included integrator's fairness concerns behavior,and constructed LSSC wholesale price contract model considering fairness concerns behavior;Finally,based on the solution and numerical simulation of the constructed model,verified the influence of fairness concerns behavior and relative competition position on the LSSC wholesale price contract.(2)Studied LSSC revenue-sharing contract model considering fairness concerns behavior.Firstly,analyzed the traditional LSSC revenue-sharing contract model;Secondly,by introducing integrators fairness concerns behavior,constructed LSSC revenue-sharing contract model considering fairness concerns behavior;Finally,based on the solution and numerical simulation of the constructed model,verified the influence of fairness concerns behavior and relative competition position on the LSSC revenue-sharing contract.(3)Studied LSSC option contract model considering fairness concerns behavior.Firstly,analyzed the traditional LSSC option contract model;Secondly,by introducing integrators fairness concerns behavior,constructed LSSC option contract model considering fairness concerns behavior;Finally,based on the solution and numerical simulation of the constructed model,verified the influence of fairness concerns behavior and relative competition position on the LSSC option contract.(4)Conducted the analysis the coordination of LSSC under integrator's fairness concerns.Firstly,derived the optimal decision of the centralized LSSC;Secondly,analyzed the coordination of LSSC under three kinds of contracts;Finally,put forward management implications based on the real life.This thesis introduced fairness concerns behavior into LSSC.On the one hand,it made decision results more referable and enriched the theory of LSSC and supply chain contracts coordination;On the other hand,it provided guidance for how to improve LSSC performance so as to enhance the market competitiveness in the practice.