Study On The Effectiveness Of Extended Producer Responsibility Policies Based On The Perspective Of Ecological Design

With the rapid development of economy,over-exploitation of energy and inefficient use by human beings has caused a serious damage to the earth's ecological environment,which has a great negative impact on the survival and development of mankind.China,as a large energy consumption country,faces enormous pressures on energy conservation and emission reduction,thus the development of circular economy has become an inevitable choice for dealing with energy and ecological crisis.Extended Producer Responsibility(EPR),as an effective system in the field of circular economy,combines advanced concepts such as "emission reduction" and"eco-design" to enable producers to consider environmental impacts from the perspective of product life cycle as well as to change the design of product and improve energy efficiency in order to achieve the sustainable development of enterprises and even the country.However,due to the late start of China's EPR system,the imperfect legislation and the implementation which lacks effective incentive mechanism,China's current EPR policy cannot provide sufficient incentives of improving the level of product design.Thus,this paper studies the incentive mechanism of EPR policy based on the present implementation of producer's extension system in our country,so as to provide effective reference for our environmental protection department to formulate effective EPR policy.The main studies include:(1)Comb and review the ecological design-related product life cycle theory and circular economy theory,as well as the Extended Producer Responsibility system related to the external theory and environmental regulation theory by reading a large number of domestic and foreign literature.This paper puts forward the necessity,research directions and goals of EPR policy implemented from the perspective of ecological design.(2)Analyze and summarize the problems in practice by combing the present situation of legislation and practice of EPR system in our country at present,as well as the evolutionary game theory is used to prove the defect of China's current EPR policy.The results demonstrate that China's current EPR policy cannot provide incentives for producers to take the initiative to improve their ecological designs.(3)Firstly,try to use the standard control policy to build the incentive mechanism.The optimal control standard model is constructed from the perspective of the maximization of social welfare,by analyzing the behavior of the decision-making bodies under the EPR system,and the factors influencing the optimal control standard are given.The results show that the efficiency of standard control policies is limited and it needs to be combined with economic incentives policy to form effective incentives.(4)Based on the EPR system,the gaming model between government combining standard and economic incentives and supply chain members is established.The results show that the EPR policy,which combines the reasonable standard control and financial incentives,can encourage the producers to improve the ecological design level of the products effectively,so as to further improve the welfare level of the society as a whole.