The Influence Of Subsidy Policy On Farmers' Social Endowment Insurance Participation Behaviors

There has been an interesting phenomenon since the establishment of the new rural social insurance system: almost all peasants are willing to be insured,meanwhile,most of them prefer to choose the minimum premium.Under the current rural social security system that integrates three funding channels: individual contributions,collectively pooled subsidies and government subsidies,the lack of individual contributions will have a significant impact on the level of pension protection level.Seeing that there is a considerable gap between the replacement rate of rural social endowment insurance and urban employees' endowment insurance,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study farmers' insurance participation behaviors and how it is affected by government subsidy policies,so as to optimize policies and improve the level of pension protection.Based on the inconsistent time preference survey data of Changsha County and Longshan County in Hunan Province,this paper constructs an incremental discounted utility model to describe farmers' endowment insurance participating behaviors.Through numerical simulation,the author analyzes the optimal insurance participation decision of different groups of farmers in two counties under the current policy and conducts a robustness test through a consistent time preference data.Afterwards,adding the subsidy policy variables,this paper conducts sensibility analysis on different subsidy modes based on the current policies and data of Changsha County.What's more,the paper also makes a robustness test with the policies and data of Longshan County.The empirical study of this article found that: i.Under the current subsidy policy,it is a rational decision for peasants to choose the minimum premium.ii.The groups of peasants who are much richer,elder and the women have a stronger willingness to pay the insurance.Furthermore,farmers in poor areas are more willing to pay for contributions,but their affordability is insufficient.iii.Compared with the consistent time preference,inconsistent time preference can better reflect the farmers' behavioral characteristics.iv.Subsidy policy for the payment stage has a better effect on the younger farmer groups,while subsidy policy for the receiving period is more welcomed by the older peasant groups.The progressive subsidy,which is different from the years subsidy,has the incentive effect of contribution.v.Non-incremental subsidies for basic pensions will inhibit farmers' enthusiasm for paying premiums,an excessive increase in basic pensions will also make more people to choose the minimum contribution level.Based on the results above,this paper puts forward some corresponding countermeasures and suggestions on how to optimize the subsidy policies for rural social endowment insurance.