Research On Pricing And Coordination Of Closed-loop Supply Chain For Two Retailers Competition Under Information Asymmetry

Presently,the analysis of pricing and coordination mainly focuses on the supply chain closed-loop,under the information symmetry of cost and demand.Also,the closed loop supply chain is constructed by a single manufacturer and a single retailer under the condition of information asymmetry.However,there is no exploration of the competition between two retailers under asymmetric information.Therefore,this paper discusses pricing decisions in coordination with the two retailers compete under asymmetric information based on the foregoing analysis has some practical value.Firstly,this thesis studies the closed-loop supply chain in which the information asymmetry is composed of single producer and single retailer,the retailer is responsible for recycling,and the retailer holds private information of its unit recovery management cost.The game theory is used to establish models of centralized decision and decentralized decision,so as to obtain the optimal pricing plan and the retailer's best false report cost,and to formulate the appropriate contract according to the mechanism design and display principle.Secondly,taking retailers' competition factors in the sales and recycling process into account,they have explored and researched the information asymmetry between the single-producer and two competing retailers,the retailer was responsible for recycling,retailers holding and hiding information on their unit recovery management costs.Using game theory to establish two models of centralized and decentralized decision-making.Then,the optimal pricing plan and retailer's optimal lie cost are obtained respectively,and the appropriate revenue-cost-sharing contract in the presence of competition is coordinated according to the mechanism design and display principle.Then,we compared the optimal strategies of competitive retailers under asymmetric information with non-competitive situations under asymmetric information: Under the condition of information asymmetry,severe competition among retailers will increase the value of the company's false management of its recycling management costs.It led to the manufacturer's indeterminate change in the repatriation transfer price,which was related to the exogenously given parameters and the degree of competition.Finally,the conclusions above were confirmed by a case study method,and the thesis discussed effects of sales and recycling competition coefficients on system pricing decisions and benefits.