Research On Incentive Mechanisms For Supplier Quality And Capacity Development In Construction

Mega project is an important measure to improve the ability of sustainable development and enhance the comprehensive national strength.The high quality and high technology in the mega project also demand for the supplier's high quality and production capacity.So this brings about the supplier development problem in the construction project.This paper investigates the incentive mechanisms for supplier development in a construction supply chain that consists of a risk-neutral owner and a risk-averse supplier.This paper focuses on the supplier quality development,supplier capacity development and the supplier quality and capacity development.Two commonly used incentive methods,including purchase price incentive and cost sharing,are focused on.Considering the owner's dominant position,a principal-agent model and a Stackelberg game model are proposed.Solving and analyzing two models,the conclusions are as follows:Firstly,both the purchasing price incentive and cost sharing can promote the supplier to improve the quality level and the capacity level.In the principal-agent model,the owner's incentives can't improve the quality level and the capacity level directly,they are used to make sure the supplier's reserved profit.In the Stackelberg game model,the owner's incentives can improve the quality level and the capacity level directly,and the impact of cost sharing on quality improvement is greater.Secondly,in the principal-agent model and the Stackelberg game model,quality and capacity improvement has the negative correlation with the supplier's production cost,and the supplier's risk tolerance level and the market demand have the positive correlation with the quality improvement.Finally,in the supplier quality development,supplier capacity development and the supplier quality and capacity development models,the total utility of the supply chain of the principal-agent model is greater than the Stackelberg game model.