Quality Cost Sharing Contract Design For Food Traceability System-optimizationand Improvement From Traditional Supply Chain To Supply And Demand Network

From tonyred to melamine,from the abuse of antibiotics to clenbuterol,along with the major issues of food safety constantly were exposed in these years,the attention of people on the food security situation had reached a new height.Although the government and enterprises had also been doing their own ability to improve food safety,the problem of food safety seemed to have never been disappeared.Traceability systemcan achieve the whole process of supervision from the farm to the table,reduce the risk of food safety to a minimum.According to the definition of quality cost,the food traceability system is constructed to ensure and improve food safety and quality.In this sense,the cost incurred during the construction and implementation of the food traceability system can be regarded as the quality cost.The quality costs of food traceability systems consist of factors such as food safety prevention costs,identification costs,and quality risk costs when food problems occur.That is,the cost of labor for food suppliers and purchasers,the cost of food testing,and food quality The cost of internal and external losses caused by the problem.The food traceability system is essentially a food quality management and control system,and the quality of the food depends on the quality management and control level of all the entities that make up the system.Due to the cumbersome process and complicated process of production and processing,some adulteration and illegal additions are easy to occur.Some entities will try to avoid the monitoring of traceability systems and conceal these safety issues,making the quality management of food traceability systems less efficient.The single logistics function of the traditional supply chain limits the “interconnection” between companies,between supply chains,and between companies and supply chains.Compared with the concept of supply and demand flow in traditional supply chain,the connotation of the supply and demand flow in supply and demand network has been greatly expanded compared to the traditional supply chain,and the function of each supply and demand flow also has a new breakthrough.For example,in the production process of a food company,the “off-the-shelf” produced by the food company is a useless waste for the company,but it is likely to be an important raw material in the processing and manufacturing process of other food companies.The member nodes in the supply and demand network can reduce system costs through a multi-functional supply and demand relationship.And through reasonable cost-sharing design to affect the production behavior of each subject,improve the quality of efforts of suppliers and manufacturers,making food traceability system can fully realize the traceability of the source,production and processing records and flow traceability and other functions.In order to ensure that the overall benefits of the traceability system are maximized,and considering the different information situations(information symmetry and information asymmetry)of the company,the cost-sharing contract for designing the food traceability system ensures that the enterprises within the system are pursuing themaximization of their own profits.At the same time take into account the overall benefits.Therefore,based on the current status and future development trend of food traceability system,the author uses principal-agent theory to design a non-information-symmetric quality-cost contract for food traceability system,and uses Stuckelberg game theory to design non-cooperation.The quality cost contract under the game.For the traceability system of traditional supply chain,a quality cost sharing model under asymmetric information is constructed.Combining the concept of supply and demand network and the principle of power mechanism,a cost-sharing contract model for traceability under complete information was constructed.First of all,according to the analytical logic of principal-agent,it can be seen that in the application of principal-agent theory to solve the agency problem,it is based on the ideal situation of information symmetry to deal with the agency problem first,and in the case of information asymmetry,the food supplier or purchaser hides.Behavior often creates moral hazard problems.To solve this problem,the principal-agent theory is used to restrict the agent's behavior by encouraging compatibility constraints,and the contract is designed based on the optimal decision under the information symmetry,helping each entity to realize its own interests maximization.Secondly,combined with the concept of supply and demand networks to help traceability systems solve difficult problems such as information islands difficult to obtain,complicated circulation links,and poor information flow,and optimize the traceability system from three aspects: producers,consumers,and governments.The construction and implementation costs have fully promoted the construction and implementation of traceability systems in China's food industry.Finally,based on the optimal design of quality contracts under asymmetric information,using the power mechanism of supply and demand networks and Stackelberg's game theory,the traceability system eliminates the double marginal effect under complete information,ensuring that the interests of members are also realized.Maximize overall benefits.