Study On Incentive And Supervision Of Predetermined Land Reserve Mode

With the process of urbanization accelerating in China,there are some problems in the construction of urban infrastructure,such as insufficient investment,single investment,narrow financing channels and so on.To alleviate the financial pressure brought by the continuous expansion of urban infrastructure,the important channels that urban infrastructure utilize land reserve to finance have been explored,with "Predetermined Land Reserve Mode" one of the effective financing,too.However,there are many uncertainty factors in the implementation of land reserve,which makes the cost of Predetermined Land Reserve deviating from the expected results.Therefore,it is of practical significance to study how to design a reasonable incentive and restraint mechanism,to mobilize enthusiasm of Project Liability Subject,so as to reduce the cost and ensure the expected realization of the financing target.Based on the analysis of the operational flow of Predetermined Land Reserve Mode,the thesis identifies the financing risk by using Risk Breakdown Structure,summarizes the reasons for the cost overruns,and defines the focus of cost control.According to the principal-agent theory,the thesis constructs a incentive and constraint model,solves the incentive level,the supervision intensity and the set of willing supervision,and provides the quantitative basis for the design of the incentive and restraint mechanism of the cost management.To execute the incentive and restraint mechanism effectively,the thesis focuses on the regulatory efficiency issues,conducts a study on whether to introduce a third party-professional supervision agency.The research's results give the prerequisite to hire the professional supervision agency for the government,and explain that the government should focus on the object of rewarding or punishing.Furthermore,this thesis discusses the way for the government to choose the quality supervision agency.Eventually,related measures are put into practice,guiding the work of land reserve implementation stage in an orderly manner.This thesis adopts the method that combining qualitative analysis with quantitative research,and studies cost control in the implementation stage of land reserve.The results of the study quantify the correlation between the output incentives and the supervisory intensity,and improve the measures that the government in inefficient supervision evaluates relevant indicators of the incentive and restraint mechanism,and finally ensure the realization of expected revenue of Predetermined Land Reserve Mode.