Research On The Impact Of Corporate Governance Mechanism On Non-efficiency Investment

Along with the rapid development of China's new normal economy and the promotion and implementation of the “The Belt and Road” strategy,the reform of state-controlled listed companies has also entered a new stage of deepening reform and standardization.However,many current state-controlled listed companies still have investment hunger,expansion impulses,investment waste and other inefficient investment and even non-efficiency investment behaviors,which not only affects the overall investment efficiency of the company,but also becomes a state-owned holding company.A stumbling block in the company's reform and transformation.The reason is that a series of principal-agent problems caused by the separation of ownership and management rights is the root cause.The checks and balances and incentive effects generated by the corporate governance mechanism can alleviate such problems,converge the interests of owners and managers,and promote their scientific and rational investment decisions,thereby can enhance the efficiency of state-controlled listed companies' investment behavior.Based on this,this paper takes the existing literature of academic scholars at home and abroad as the foothold.Firstly,it defines the corporate governance mechanism and non-efficiency investment behavior of state-controlled listed companies.Secondly,relying on the relevant theoretical achievements of corporate governance and inefficient behaviors,including information asymmetry theory,principal-agent theory and free cash flow theory,the governance mechanism of state-controlled listed companies is further divided into “checks and balances” and“Incentive” two mechanisms to propose corresponding research hypotheses for the impact of non-efficiency investment behaviors.Through the financial data samples of China's state-controlled listed companies from 2015 to 2017,a multivariate regression model was established,and data analysis software was used to conduct further analysis and research.The following relevant conclusions are drawn:First,China's state-controlled listed companies generally have non-efficiency investment problems,and the degree of non-efficiency between companies isrelatively large,further indicating that there is more room for the efficiency of state-controlled listed companies.Second,the “incentive” mechanism of state-controlled listed companies has a significant negative impact on non-efficiency investments.Third,the “check and balance” mechanism of state-controlled listed companies has a significant negative impact on non-efficiency investments.This further indicates that the company's governance mechanism can improve the company's inefficient investment behavior.It is not difficult to see that the “checks and balances” and “incentives” of the governance structure of state-controlled listed companies will significantly inhibit and mitigate the company's non-efficiency investment.Finally,based on the above research conclusions,from the practical point of view,put forward measures and suggestions for enriching and perfecting the governance mechanism of China's state-controlled listed companies,thereby alleviating and suppressing non-efficiency investment behavior,promoting the scientific management of state-controlled listed companies and realizing state-owned Rapid transformation and upgrading of the enterprise industry.