Property Right,Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance And Perks

In recent years, the negative reports on the managers' perks of state-owned enterprises have been increased, and the state-owned enterprises extravagant corruption has been increasingly serious, perks has become an additional agency cost of the state-owned enterprise, which has a certain impact on the role of state-owned enterprises in the national economy. Therefore, in the face of increasingly serious national economic situation, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held a meeting on December 4, 2012, unanimously adopted the "on improving the work style, close contact with the masses of the eight provisions." Accelerate the pace of state-owned enterprise reform and anti-corruption bid. The state frequently introduced policies to regulate the consumption of state-owned enterprise managers, at the same time,enterprises study how to effectively deal with this phenomenon has become a top priority. In China, the directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) as a new type of insurance, it has proved its supervisory and incentive corporation governance role in the capital market of the western countries. But in our unique institutional background and legal environment, research D&O insurance has played a supervisory and incentive role or exacerbated manager's moral hazard, it is of great significance to our regulators, enterprises and investors.This paper based on the listed companies' financial data from 2008-2015 as the initial sample. Based on sorting and collecting the relevant data of property rights, D&O insurance and managers' perks, through the combing of the relevant literature, putting forward reasonable assumptions and empirical research, analyzing the relationship among the nature of property rights, D&O insurance and managers' perks. The results show that the introduction of D&O insurance indulges managers' perks' level; Further distinguish different property rights, the state-owned enterprises exacerbates the promotion between D&O insurance and managers' perks' level.The conclusion of this paper provides empirical evidence for the governance heterogeneity of D&O insurance under different property rights in China, meanwhile,further enriches the research system of influencing factors of managers' perks.Currently, D&O insurance can not alleviate the problem of managers' perks, but it is undeniable that this paper for the company in the choice of corporate governance to provide a new perspective. With the further improvement of relevant laws and systems and information transparency, the external environment for the development of D&O insurance will be improved.Accurately play the governance role of D&O insurance,which helps to improve the supervisory and incentive system.