Research On The Selective Mechanism Is Based On The Perspective Of Corporate Governance Of State-owned Enterprises

Top manager selection is a key problem of modern enterprise theory. Whenthe ownership and operational rights separate, principal-agent problem highlightsin state owned enterprises. After30years of reform and opening up, state-ownedenterprises conducted a series of reforms, improved the manager’s enthusiasmand business performance. However, the administration of state-ownedenterprises is not conducive to the selection of an excellent manager and thehealthy development of state-owned enterprises. The root is the issue ofcorporate governance structure.Therefore, this paper mainly studies the topmanagers selection problems on the perspective of corporate governance.The paper starts its analysis from three aspects: comparative analysis, caseanalysis and empirical analysis. In comparative analysis, this paper comparessimilarities and differences of the top manager selection model between UnitedStates, Germany, Japan and France.The second analysis focuses on state-ownedenterprises in Beijing in the selective mechanism. The empirical analysis mainlydiscusses the empirical relationship of the managers turnover, corporategovernance and company performance.At the end of the paper, the top managers selection mechanism instate-owned enterprises is designed. Concluded as follows:(1)China’senterprises should perfect the supervision model of categorized management inthe selection and appointment of top managers;(2) State-owned enterprisesshould further cultivate the successors and at the same time perfect the externalmanager market.(3)State-owned enterprises should establish a scientific,comprehensive operators evaluation system, and a reasonable selection processshould be designed.