Research On The Mode Of The Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance In China Based On Game Theory

Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance make the third party liability as the insurance subject,mainly to share the responsibility for the payment of the enterprise's pollution accident.Its advantage is to protect the third party victims receive timely payment,to reduce the burden of payment pressure for the enterprise,and also to share part of the cost of environmental governance for the government,which can achieve the win-win situation.China has gradually started to explore the Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance for more than 15 years.In order to encourage the implementation of it,the government has introduced relevant policies.Under this guidance,many cities achieved some success.But look on the reality of the situation,China's implementation of the Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance is still facing the "double-cold" situation,and one of the main reason is without a clear mode.In order to promote the development of the Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance,it's indispensable for us to discuss a suitable mode.Based on the related theories,first and foremost,I make an overview of the development of the Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance in our country,and point out a series of reasons include vague mode,enterprise's weak conscious of risk management,insurance company's lack insured wishes,and short of professional technical support.Then establish both static game model and dynamic game model to explore the relations among the three parties,which provide the theoretical basis for selecting mode.What's more,upon the optimal strategies of the government,I draw a conclusion that it's better to carry out both compulsory insurance and voluntary insurance,giving priority to the compulsory insurance.Last but not least,I provide decision-making reference for relevant subject,from the law,the regulation,the policy,the technical support system and so forth.