Real Estate Destocking Model And Countermeasure Analysis Under Interest Equilibrium

The real estate industry is a production element of Chinese national economic development,and the construction industry led by it accounts for more than 30% of the Gross national income.However,in recent years,the high inventory of Chinese real estate has become an urgent problem to be solved,and de-stocking will be an important measure to stabilize Chinese real estate market.Then,the real estate inventory's removal involves the government,developers,consumers and other stakeholders.Different stakeholders have different interests,but there is little unified interest basis and lack of interest coordination mechanism,which restricts the pace of Chinese real estate destocking to a certain extent.Therefore,analyzing the game relations among various interest subjects of real estate inventory,exploring effective methods to remove real estate inventory,giving reasonable suggestions,establishing a system to encourage the destocking of real estate have practical significance to stabilize the equilibrium of China's real estate market.This paper has analyzed the basic situation of Chinese real estate inventory from two aspects--real estate inventory and incremental inventory,and further explored the existing problems of real estate inventory destocking.In the study of real estate inventory,this paper has constructed a differential game model for stakeholders of real estate inventory,then studied the interest relationship between the central government and local governments with or without policy incentives,and the interest relationship between the government and developers in the process of inventory supply.According to the real estate development process,the "prisoner's dilemma" has been constructed in the land acquisition stage,in the stage of operation,a threedimensional game model is built based on the market equilibrium theory,the balance of interests among the government,developers and consumers in the newly added inventory has been explored.Real estate stock inventory balance interests game research shows that: in the policy-related housing stock supply,the more central government provides fiscal subsidies for the local government,the more local government supplies housing stock.The central government gains more expected optimal supply with the fiscal incentives than expected optimal supply without fiscal incentives;before the government repurchases the existing inventory,the repurchase price,the quantity of existing housing provided by developers,and relevant policy subsidies all tend to converge and restrict each other.Real estate increment inventory balance interests game research shows that: in the land acquisition stage,the government has always pursued the balance of political interests and economic interests.The government's regulatory and developers' compliance forms the Nash equilibrium.Developers should compete land fairly,avoid collusion,and make full use of land resources to avoid land prices being inflated;in the operation stage,the benefits of both developers and consumers have been impacted by the expectation and preference of the three main factors--real estate price,quality and service.Besides,the higher expectation of real estate consumers have,the lower inventory pressure developers have.