Comparative Study Of The Impact Of Executive Incentive Contracts On Firm Performance From The Perspective Of Classified Governance

The executive incentive contract is one of the important means to achieve the same interests of the principal and the agent,reduce the cost of the agency and improve the performance of the company.After the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee,the reform of state-owned enterprises entered a new stage of deepening reform.Based on the different levels and different functions of state-owned enterprises,the classification and management of state-owned enterprises is an inevitable choice for the reform of state-owned enterprises.Therefore,unlike most scholars who have studied all listed companies as a whole,this paper is based on the perspective of state-owned enterprises,comprehensively considering the incentive effect of explicit and implicit incentives for state-owned enterprise executives,and listing with private enterprises.The company's executive incentives are compared,and the design proposals for state-owned enterprise executive incentive contracts are proposed in a targeted manner,in order to better play the leading advantages of China's state-owned enterprises in economic development.Based on the principal-agent theory,this paper uses variety of analytical methods to explain the inherent logic of explicit and implicit incentives of private and state-owned listed companies from both theoretical and empirical aspects.And put forward suggestions for the design of executive incentive system in different types of enterprises.First,it summarizes the previous studies on the economic consequences of explicit incentives for executives,the economic consequences of implicit incentives for executives,and the reform of state-owned enterprises.Secondly,according to related theories,the impact of executive compensation incentives.reputation incentives on company performance and the regulatory role of government control on these relationships are analyzed,and corresponding hypotheses and researches are proposed.model.Thirdly,the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2013 to 2017 were selected as research samples,and the hypotheses were empirically tested by descriptive statistical analysis,correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis.The research results show that in private and competitive state-owned listed companies,executive compensation incentives can significantly promote corporate performance growth,and executive compensation in private listed companies promotes corporate performance.Secondly,among the state-owned listed companies and non-competitive state-owned listed companies,there is a significant positive correlation between executive reputation incentives and corporate performance.In other words,reputational incentives can effectively stimulate the enthusiasm of senior executives,constrain the misconduct of executives,and thus improve corporate performance.In addition,in private and competitive listed companies,government control can significantly negatively regulate the relationship between executive incentives and corporate performance,that is,as the government's control increases,it will weaken the salary incentives and reputation incentives for corporate performance.Promote the effect.That is to say,the government can appropriately relax the control of private and competitive listed companies and enhance their vitality,which is consistent with the idea in the"Guiding Opinions on the Definition and Classification of State-Owned Enterprises".Based on the above research conclusions,this paper proposes the following policy recommendations:First,do not cross-cut the governance of state-owned enterprises.The remuneration of state-owned enterprise executives should be linked to the performance of enterprises,but differentiated between competitive and non-competitive state-owned enterprises.The correlation between executive compensation and performance of competitive state-owned enterprises is strong,and the executive compensation of state-owned enterprises should be strengthened.The degree of marketization will further promote the role of executive compensation in promoting corporate performance.Second,for non-competitive state-owned listed companies,the introduction of reputation incentive mechanism,to achieve the reputation of non-competitive state-owned enterprise executives misconduct,restrain the decline in corporate performance,play the role of state-owned enterprises in economic development,and promote the development of the national economy.Third,the government appropriately relaxes the control of private enterprises and competitive state-owned listed companies,strengthens the reform of mixed ownership,introduces the non-public ownership economy,and enhances its vitality.