Information,Mortgage Guarantee And SME Financing

Bank loans are the most important external financing channels for SMEs in China at present.However,SMEs are restricted by bank credit rationing in the process of applying for loans.The main reason for this phenomenon is the information asymmetry between banks and enterprises.Therefore,it is the main purpose of this paper to alleviate the degree of information asymmetry,reduce the efficiency loss caused by information asymmetry,and improve the availability of credit funds for SMEs.The difficulty of financing SMEs is affected by real factors.From the perspective of SMEs themselves,the characteristics of organizational structure and the particularity of business models determine that banks are difficult to control their business risks.In addition,the confusion of financial management system has more the degree of information asymmetry;from the characteristics of financing needs of SMEs Generally speaking,it has the characteristics of small single financing amount,unstable financing demand,and high timeliness of capital availability.From the perspective of optional financing channels for small and medium-sized enterprises,bank loans are still the first choice for SMEs to conduct external financing.At the same time,in the interest rate market environment,commercial banks are also in urgent need of finding breakthroughs in performance;in the context of the continuous release of liquidity by the People's Bank of China and the implementation of appropriate loose credit policies for commercial banks,commercial banks have increased the credit balance of SMEs.The main reason for the decline is that commercial banks are also constrained by risk prevention and control while developing credit business.Based on the analysis of realistic factors,this paper further establishes a game model of silver and enterprise.It is assumed that SMEs can only obtain external financing from commercial banks,and both banks and enterprises will play a game on the content of credit contracts.Analyze and study whether there is effective separation equilibrium under the condition of information asymmetry;whether there is efficiency loss in equilibrium state,what is the difference in efficiency loss of different types of SMEs in equilibrium state,and what are the main reasons for these differences;In addition,how the unit credit cost of commercial banks affects the financing of SMEs is also the main problem of model research.The results show that under the condition of information asymmetry,banks design credit contracts for three types of SMEs(category 1,low risk and can provide mortgage guarantee;category 2,high risk and can provide mortgage guarantee;category 3,low-risk and unable to provide mortgage guarantees)to choose,can achieve the result of partial separation and equilibrium,that is,to distinguish the first-class SMEs,compared with the complete information situation,the income levels of the three types of SMEs are reduced to varying degrees,In the case that the second category of SMEs accounted for a relatively high proportion,there was even a reverse selection,and the third category of SMEs withdrew from the credit market.It can be seen that the importance of information im the game of silver and enterprise.By comparing the equilibrium returns of the first and third types of SMEs,it can be seen that if the low-risk SMEs can obtain the support of the mortgage guarantee,the financing dilemma will be improved;further,if the cost of the mortgage guarantee is zero,then the low-risk small and medium-sized Enterprises will reach the level of income under full information conditions,and the inefficient loss of low-risk SMEs;under the assumption that all SMEs can obtain mortgage guarantees,the game can achieve complete separation and balance,and SMEs can reach full information conditions.There is no efficiency loss in the allocation of credit resources.In addition,the unit loan cost of the commercial bank in the model restricts the optional contract level of the SME(the loan interest rate level and the mortgage guarantee requirement),reduces the credit cost of the bank,can further reduce the financing cost of the SME,and improve the income level of the SME..Since the information asymmetry has caused the efficiency loss of both banks and enterprises,and the low-risk SMEs lacking mortgage guarantees face a more severe financing situation due to adverse selection,the unit loan cost of banks further restricts the scope of optional contracts for SMEs.To this end,based on the model analysis,this paper proposes the following improvements:First,accelerate the construction of the social credit system;second,develop the financing guarantee business for SMEs,and further reduce the financing rate;Third,encourage commercial banks to use financial technology to enhance Credit management level;hope to contribute to alleviating the financing dilemma of SMEs.