Analysis Of The Influence Of Controlling Shareholders' Tunneling Behavior On The Investors Of Listed Companies

In order to effectively alleviate the conflicts between shareholders and management,the listed company has established a centralized governance mechanism.With the gradual easing of the agency problem between the two sides,a new agency problem has been created because the company's ownership is too concentrated,that is,the controlling shareholders of the listed companies are prone to "tunnel behavior".The concept of "tunnel behavior" of the controlling shareholder is defined as that the large shareholders of the listed company take advantage of some unlawful or unlawful means to transfer the funds and assets of the company through underground tunnels in order to own their own interests,and then cause the wealth of the small and medium shareholders and the listed companies to be hollowed out and the interests of the company are damaged.The tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders is not easy to detect,but it has great influence on the internal and external businesses and small and medium investors.This paper focuses on the analysis of the influence of the "tunnel behavior" of the controlling shareholders of the listed companies on the small and medium investors.Through collating and summarizing the following common means of the "tunnel behavior" of the controlling shareholders of the listed companies:(1)the large shareholders' false capital contribution;(2)of the large shareholders arbitrarily puts the funds raised by the listed companies to be;(3)the large shareholders of the company have occupied or misappropriated the funds of the listed companies;(4)to transfer the resources of the company through the large shareholders of the insider trading;(5)to plunder the wealth of the small and medium shareholders by the shares or the additional shares;(6)using assets reorganization to transfer assets.According to these measures,there are several reasons for the "tunnel behavior" of the controlling shareholders:(1)the "one shareholder" of the large shareholders,the irrational share structure;(2)the split of ownership liquidity,the disagreement between the interests of the large shareholders and the small and medium shareholders;(3)the legal system is not sound,and the protection of the interests of the small and medium shareholders is weakened;(4)governance mechanism is not sound,incentive and restraint mechanisms fail.;(5)external governance mechanisms fail,lack of effective supervision;(6)lacking of credibility.It also analyzes the motives of controlling shareholders "tunnel behavior",and lays a solid foundation for the following case analysis.After analyzing the means,causes and motives of the "tunnel behavior" of the controlling shareholders of the listed companies,the "tunnel behavior" of the controlling shareholders is defined and differentiated through the case analysis of the global Limited by Share Ltd,which makes the investors more intuitively understand the "tunnel behavior" of the controlling shareholders of the listed companies.This paper analyzes the influence of the tunneling behavior of the controlling shareholder on the internal and small investors and industries of the listed companies.It comes to the conclusion that the quotient global Limited by Share Ltd has actually taken place in the "tunnel behavior" of the controlling shareholders,and then the verification analysis is carried out from two aspects.In the discussion of how to effectively contain the behavior of the large shareholders,the following several angles have been analyzed:(1)from the inside of the company(2)from the outside of the company.The following aspects are analyzed on how to protect the interests of small and medium shareholders:(1)from the perspective of the government function;(2)from the angle of accounting standards;(3)from the angle of law and regulation;(4)from the perspective of corporate governance;(5)from the perspective of small and medium investors.After conclusion and discussion,a case is presented.The following countermeasures:(1)to further improve the system of relevant laws and regulations and to strengthen the protection of small and medium investors;(2)the formulation and improvement of accounting standards should keep pace with the times,and further refine the standards of information disclosure;(3)to strengthen the independence of independent directors by establishing and improving the long-term incentive and restraint mechanisms."And" justice "(4)from the perspective of equity checks and balances to make the corporate governance structure gradually improve;(5)to promote the overall listing as the focus,the elimination of related transaction based tunnel behavior;(6)for the development of institutional investors to provide good environment conditions.This paper is divided into the following parts: the first part is the introduction,which mainly introduces the proposition and significance of the research and innovation.The second part is the literature review,which mainly includes the literature review and literature review of the "tunnel behavior" theory of controlling shareholders and the influence of "tunnel behavior" of controlling shareholders.The third part is about the way,causes and motives of controlling shareholders' tunneling behavior.The fourth part is the case analysis,including the company profile,the definition and distinction of the "tunnel behavior" of the controlling shareholders of the company,and the analysis of the influence of the "tunnel behavior" of the controlling shareholders on the small and medium investors and the industry.The fifth part is the conclusions,discussions and countermeasures.