The Advertising And Membership Fee Dicision Of Video Bilateral Platform

Video website is a kind of special two-sided platform,the two sides of the platform are advertisers and consumers.Usually advertisers want the platform to possess more consumers,but consumers generally do not like too many advertisers.In recent years,the transformation of the charging mode of video platform is the major revolution in the network video industry.The initial charging model the platform adopted was the skewed pricing strategy,which charges advertisers for advertising fee but charges consumers for free.However,as the market competition intensifies,it is difficult for video platform to survive if it acquires revenue only from advertisers.More and more video platforms have launched the two-stage pricing model of "paying first and then broadcasting for free".In this model,the strategic behavior of consumers becomes an important consideration.In addition,due to the rise of copyright costs and the problem of homogenization of content,the video platform began to focus on home-made programs,hoping to seek differential development in the fierce competition of homogeneity by providing content with different quality.Therefore,this paper makes an intensive study of the pricing of video platform in both monopolistic market and competitive market.This paper firstly studies the pricing of monopolized video platform which only acquires advertising fees from advertisers and gets the optimal advertising fees and profits under equilibrium conditions.The study also finds that the advertising volume,optimal advertising cost and optimal profit of the video platform are directly proportional to the externality that consumers bring to advertisers.Also,the optimal advertising fees of the platform will increase but he optimal profit will decrease with the increase of consumers' boredom of advertisers.Then,the pricing of monopolized video platform considering consumers' strategic behavior is studied for different charging modes of two-stage video broadcast,that is,the first stage is only broadcasted for paying consumers,and the second stage is broadcasted for all consumers for free.The optimal membership fee in the first stage and the optimal advertising fee in the second stage are obtained by establishing the corresponding revenue model.The results also show that the optimal advertising fees always increase in the proportion of strategic consumers.However,the optimal membership fees decrease only when consumers have less external utility to advertisers and consumers are extremely tired of advertising;Otherwise,it will decrease first and then increase.Finally,considering the oligopoly market where the paid video platform and the free video platform coexist,the competition between the paid video platform and the free video platform is studied by constructing the Hotelling model and the optimal quality and pricing of the platform under competitive conditions are obtained.It is also found that only when the intensity of self-network externality is high as well as consumers are less bored with advertising,or when the intensity of self-network externality is low and consumers are extremely tired of advertising,the program quality and profit of paid video platform will be higher than the free one;otherwise when the intensity of self-network externality is low as well as consumers are extremely tired of advertising,or when the intensity of self-network externality is high and consumers are less bored with advertising,the program quality and profit of free video platform will be higher than the paid one.