| As the financial management intermediate core link,investment decision-making drives the growth of corporate value and is an indispensable part of achieving the goal of maximizing shareholders' wealth.With the deepening of the current concept of sustainable economic development,the state constantly guides enterprises to take healthy development as the guidance,improve the investment efficiency of enterprises,and thus achieve healthy economic development.The state-owned economy plays an important role in the smooth operation of China's macro economy.However,the particularity of China's property rights system environment has spawned the extensive growth concept of state-owned enterprises,and the phenomenon of over-investment has been repeatedly banned.The financial support brought by the soft budget constraints,the agency problems caused by the strong administrative characteristics of the actual controllers have prompted the management to impulsive investment,which not only harms the interests of shareholders,but also affects the sustainable growth of enterprises,and also makes capacity expansion difficult to suppress and hinders economic development.Therefore,in order to comply with the supply-side structural reform trend,the theoretical and practical circles have begun to pay attention to the governance of over-investment,and want to adjust the structure and stabilize growth through institutional arrangements that inhibit excessive investment.Based on the above economic background,this paper examines the relationship between corporate governance,EVA assessment and over-investment by taking the EVA performance appraisal policy introduced by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission in 2010 to improve the efficiency of central enterprise investment.Firstly,by reading relevant literatures,the paper summarizes the achievements and shortcomings of existing research,analyzes the relationship between corporate governance and EVA assessment and over-investment,and the internal relationship between the three,and proposes three related hypotheses.Secondly,based on the sample data in 2011-2016,through empirical analysis,we first refer to the residual model of Richardson to weigh up the level of over-investment,and the 10 influencing factors of internal corporate governance structure.The composite score was calculated by principal component analysis method as a measure of corporate governance.And then gradually explored through three regression models.The relationship between corporate governance and over-investment,EVA assessment and over-investment,and corporate governance and EVA assessment as a whole and over-investment is discussed.The research results show that:(1)Corporate governance and over-investment are significantly negatively correlated at the 1% confidence level.It shows that the higher the corporate governance level of state-owned listed companies,the more the over-investment behavior will be better suppressed;(2)EVA assessment and over-investment are significantly negative at the 1% confidence level.It shows that EVA assessment can also significantly inhibit over-investment of state-owned listed companies;(3)The interaction between corporate governance and EVA assessment is significantly negative at 10%,indicating that EVA assessment and corporate governance work together on excessive investment behavior.The effect can strengthen the suppression of excessive investment behavior.EVA assessment can strengthen the negative correlation between corporate governance and over-investment,and corporate governance can also strengthen the negative correlation between EVA assessment and over-investment.Finally,according to the research conclusions,it proposes countermeasures from the aspects of improving the corporate governance structure of state-owned enterprises and ensuring the effective implementation of EVA assessment of state-owned enterprises.The innovation of this paper is to select the 10 influencing factors of the company's internal governance structure by principal component analysis method to comprehensively examine the corporate governance level,and put the corporate governance and EVA assessment in the same framework to study the EVA assessment.The impact of corporate governance on over-investment,found that the combined effect of EVA assessment and corporate governance can strengthen the suppression of excessive investment behavior.EVA assessment can strengthen the inhibition of corporate governance on over-investment,and corporate governance can also strengthen the inhibition of EVA assessment on over-investment,thus providing a new direction for the governance of over-investment. |
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