Research On The Stable Mode Of Land Management Rights In Family Farms

Family farms are the only way to realize the scale and intensification of agricultural production when the right to land management is circulated.At present,the market for the transfer of land ownership rights for family farms in China is slowly growing and the scale of circulation is relatively small.The related systems and policies are still not perfect.Family farms have poor stability in the transfer of land management rights and hinder the sustained and healthy development of family farms in China.Unstable land management rights mean that the land use rights are unstable,which increases the transaction costs of family farms for agricultural land circulation,increases the investment risk of agricultural land,and the stability of household rural land management rights needs to be improved.In view of the above problems,based on the theory of channel behavior,theory of relationship commitment and transaction cost theory,this paper combines theory with practice to establish a stable index system of family farmland management rights,and uses the analytic hierarchy process to weight its indicators.Through the statistical analysis of the survey data of three villages A,B,and C in the same township in Changsha,Hunan province,it was found that based on the three different types of land transfer patterns in the three villages,the stability of the family farm land management rights is different and its stability is different.The sequence of results from small to large is: lease transfer(A village)<anti-rental packet transfer(B village)<share cooperative circulation(c village).The turnover of the stock cooperative system is relatively longer than that of the anti-rent and reverse-paid package.The turnover period is relatively longer,which allows family farms to have sufficient time to recover their investment in production and operations,and guarantees the stability of land management rights.In addition,the joint-stock dividend model promoted the income of family farms and guaranteed their income expectations.Shareholding Cooperative Transfer Model Compared to the rental model,village collectives act as intermediaries for guarantees,which reduces the risk of the transfer of family farmland management rights and makes their production operations more secure and stable.Different modes of rural land transfer will affect the stability of family farmland management rights.The comparison of different modes of circulation is to better select the mode of circulation.Through case analysis,this paper compares and studies the stability mechanism of the transfer of land management right of family farms in Shanghai Songjiang,Shandong Dongping,Anhui Fanchang,and North Guangxi F counties.The following conclusions have been drawn: First,due to differences in economic conditions,ideological conditions,and circulation basis in different regions,it is imperative to adjust measures to the establishment of stable mechanisms for family farmland management rights;secondly,village collectives are the core of promoting the stability of family farmland management rights.Strength and government support are the necessary conditions for promoting the stability of family farmland management rights.Finally,we believe that the land shareholding cooperative model is a stable institutional innovation of the family farm land management rights.It achieves centralized land management at a minimum transaction cost and is a modest scale.Operational promotion and modern agricultural development have created the basic conditions and are effective models to promote the stability of family farmland management rights.