Study On The Effectiveness Of Equity Incentive For The Founder Team Of Growth Enterprises Under The Prospect Theory

As an effective way for listed companies to motivate specific personnel,equity incentive has always been attached importance to by listed companies.The pilot measures on equity incentive management of listed companies issued by China securities regulatory commission(CSRC)in 2005 have aroused a surge of imitation in various industries in China.However,the intensification of agent conflicts hinders the effectiveness of equity incentive to a certain extent.How to avoid its negative impact and promote the behavior of the incentivized objects to be consistent with the interests of corporate shareholders and corporate development is an important topic.Based on the prospect theory,this paper makes an empirical analysis of the effectiveness of equity incentive for the founder team of innovation-oriented enterprises,so as to improve the existing equity incentive model and further alleviate principal-agent conflicts.Starting from the research Angle of view of prospect theory,this paper firstly combed the theory against revenue loss under the personal risk decision-making behavior,and then based on the framework analysis of equity incentive for innovative enterprises founder group decision-making behavior affect the three elements of risk,to the enterprise's financial risk and business performance as indicators of risk decision-making,put forward six conforms to the hypothesis that the framework,in2015 and again in 2016,has been the implementation of equity incentive related data of a-share listed innovative companies build theory of regression analysis model is established and verified,the final test conclusions.In this paper,when the economic downward pressure is increasing,the implementation of equity incentive for the founder team has no significant impact on the asset-liability ratio of the enterprise in the short term,but it has a significant positive correlation with the financial leverage coefficient and business performance of the enterprise.Specifically,in the economic downward pressure,founder of the team to face the reality of stock prices fall,as long as the stock price is still good at right price above,founder of the team will risk in venture capital showed evident characteristics of risk aversion,and the characteristics of risk aversion will accompany equity vesting period of spin and more obvious,so miss more investmentopportunities resulting in a decline in performance and makes their decision-making behavior may deviate from the enterprise long-term development targets,and the interests of the shareholders will not be able to maintain consistency.And prospect theory to judge this person in the face of gain and loss of risk decision-making behavior,therefore,this article suggested that from the government and the enterprise two angles,put forward the implementation and improvement of the listed company equity incentive related Suggestions and measures,with an emphasis on relative stock exercise price and the influence of the vesting period on incentive effectiveness,rather than equity.