Study On Pay-for-Performance Mechanism For O&M In Projects Of Urban Utility Tunnel

With the acceleration of new urbanization construction in China,urban comprehensive pipeline corridor,as an efficient and intensive mode of municipal pipeline operation and maintenance,has been actively promoted throughout the country.The combination of urban comprehensive Corridor project and PPP model not only alleviates the financial pressure of government investment and construction,but also brings considerable economic returns to the social capital side.However,at present,there are many problems in the operation phase of PPP project of comprehensive pipe corridors in cities in China after the completion of the construction period.For example,the low rate of entrance leads to the serious idleness of the comprehensive corridor resources,and the lack of professional operation and maintenance team leads to the inefficiency of the comprehensive corridor operation and serious cost waste.Therefore,from the perspective of the government,it mainly studies the performance evaluation and pay-for-performance incentive mechanism of PPP project operation and maintenance management in the comprehensive corridor of the social capital side.Firstly,in order to scientifically evaluate the operation and maintenance management of PPP project in urban comprehensive corridors,it establishes an evaluation index system for the operation and maintenance performance of PPP project in urban comprehensive corridors in China based on reading and analyzing a large number of documents and materials and combining with the actual project.The weight of each index of operation and maintenance performance evaluation is determined by questionnaire survey and analytic hierarchy process,so as to make fair and efficient operation and maintenance performance evaluation in the process of project operation and maintenance management.Secondly,based on the principal-agent theory,the new public management theory and the basic principles of economics,it constructs the incentive game model of PPP project operation and maintenance on the basis of pay-for-performance.It includes the economic utility function of the social capital,the economic utility function of the government and the social utility function.Based on the comprehensive utility function of the government and the economic utility function of the social capital,the dynamic game model under the condition of complete information is constructed.Through the numerical calculation method of Stackelberg game,the refined Nash equilibrium solution of sub-game between government and social capital is obtained.Thirdly,the comprehensive utility function of the government,the economic utility function of the social capital and the refined Nash equilibrium solution of sub-game are analyzed by sensitivity analysis.Based on the analysis of various indicators,it puts forward some countermeasures for the operation and maintenance management of PPP project in urban comprehensive corridors in China.Among them,the government needs to maintain the stability and continuity of policy,and strengthen the supervision and audit of the comprehensive corridor project.The social capital needs to strengthen the organization and system construction of the project operation and maintenance management,and use Internet technology to build the information operation and maintenance platform of the comprehensive corridor project.Finally,based on the PPP project operation and maintenance performance evaluation index system and incentive model,the case study method is used to simulate the actual validation.Through the fitting analysis of the actual indicators of the case and the equilibrium solution of the game,the practical guiding value of the project performance evaluation-incentive model is realized,which is conducive to giving full play to the complementary role of the government and social capital in the PPP project of the comprehensive corridor,and ultimately achieving the win-win goal.