Evolutionary Game Research On Private Enterprises Participating In PPP Projects

As a new type of project financing model,the PPP model has attracted extensive attention and a large number of applications in the field of public utility construction.In China,the social capital in the PPP model mainly includes public-owned economies represented by central enterprises and local state-owned enterprises,and non-publicowned economies represented by private enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises.Among them,the participation of private enterprises has an important significance in the process of promoting the PPP model.On the one hand,under the influence of market competition,private enterprises have more efficient profit models and management models,which can effectively improve the quality of public services.On the other hand,the essence of PPP is to cooperate with private capital,only to introduce private capital,that is,private enterprises,can truly ease the financial pressure and transfer risks.However,the reality is that a large number of PPP projects are participated by state-owned enterprises,while private enterprises have less participation,and the participation rate has been declining in terms of the proportion of private enterprises participating in PPP projects.This paper studies the decision-making mechanism of private enterprises in PPP projects,and analyzes the reasons for the decline of private enterprises' participation in PPP projects from the perspective of the game relationship between government departments and private enterprises,so as to find solutions to problems from a theoretical perspective.It is of great significance to promote the healthy and sustainable development of China's PPP model.Based on the analysis and combing of the status quo of China's participation in PPP projects,the paper identifies the factors affecting the participation of private enterprises in PPP projects,and analyzes the intrinsic influence mechanism between the factors.Based on the analysis results,the paper replicates the dynamic model of private enterprises and government departments in the PPP model,analyzes the stability of decision-making equilibrium points from the perspective of evolutionary game,and draws the game under different parameters.The theoretical model is applied to the level of empirical analysis.Through the data collection and measurement,the values of various parameters in the current PPP market in China are obtained.The simulation of the game is carried out by Matlab,and the feasibility and effectiveness of the model are verified.Based on the results,the reasons for the decline in the participation of private enterprises in PPP projects are discussed.,finding that the low return on investment is an important reason for the decline in the participation of private enterprises.Secondly,there are problems such as lack of comprehensive evaluation mechanism of project benefits,insufficient support of input costs or inefficiency,low administrative efficiency,and large incremental risks.Based on the analysis results,the paper puts forward corresponding policy recommendations,in order to create a fair market participation environment,ensure that private enterprises and government departments obtain reasonable maximum benefits in the process of cooperation,and lay a foundation for the development of PPP cooperation in a positive direction.The analysis results can provide a reference for the future development of policy opinions on encouraging private enterprises to participate in PPP projects.