Study On The Optimization Of The Implementation Mechanism Of Targeted Poverty Alleviation

Targeted poverty alleviation is an important guarantee for building a moderately prosperous society in all respects.Since the implementation of targeted poverty alleviation,China's poverty alleviation project has made remarkable achievements,but there are also some problems,such as the deviation of identifying and targeting poverty alleviation targets,the deviation of poverty alleviation beneficiary groups and the increase of moral risks of poverty alleviation targets.To some extent,these problems have lost the efficiency of poverty alleviation and restricted the realization of poverty alleviation goals.All these problems are closely related to the imperfect implementation mechanism of targeted poverty alleviation.Therefore,this paper takes targeted poverty alleviation as the orientation and the implementation mechanism of targeted poverty alleviation as the research object,discusses the institutional root of the problem of targeted poverty alleviation,and then proposes the optimization scheme of the implementation mechanism of targeted poverty alleviation,with a view to providing theoretical basis for eliminating the problem of targeted poverty alleviation.First,based on the practical experience of targeted poverty alleviation,this paper summarizes the implementation mechanism of targeted poverty alleviation in China by using the method of institutional analysis.This paper analyzes the behavioral goals and functions of targeted poverty alleviation subjects,the path selection of targeted poverty alleviation,the operation mechanism of the implementation mechanism of targeted poverty alleviation,and the conditions for the efficient operation of the implementation mechanism of targeted poverty alleviation,etc.,laying the theoretical foundation for the research of this paper.Secondly,from the perspective of the implementation mechanism of targeted poverty alleviation,this paper elaborates the reasons for the deviation of identification for targeted poverty alleviation object from the perspective of game analysis.Practical experience shows that this problem mainly arises from the identification of poor households in theimplementation mechanism of targeted poverty alleviation.The reasons are as follows: the supervision of villagers and poor households,the supervision of poverty alleviation cadres and villagers' democratic evaluation group,and the failure of poverty alleviation supervision of township and township governments.Using the game supervision model,this paper analyzes the game relationship between the poor households and non-poor households,and analyzes the reasons for the failure of supervision between villagers and poor households.Using the analytical method of economics,this paper probes into the supervision failure caused by the low work efficiency and low work enthusiasm of government poverty alleviation cadres.Using the information transmission and feedback model between the upper and lower levels of government,this paper expounds the recognition deviation caused by the reason that the lower levels of government ignore the recognition quality in pursuit of political achievements.Based on the above research,three strategies for optimizing the implementation mechanism of targeted poverty alleviation were proposed: the publicity of targeted poverty alleviation should be strengthened to increase the participation of villagers and poor households,and reduce the supervision cost thus improve their enthusiasm for supervision;the responsibility of poverty alleviation should be clarified,and the cost of performing supervision duties should be reduced,thus stimulate the enthusiasm of poverty alleviation cadres in grassroots work;information transmission and feedback channels between governments at higher and lower levels should be established and improved to reduce the "digital poverty alleviation" activities of township and township governments.Thirdly,game analysis and other methods are used to explain the reasons for the deviation of targeted poverty alleviation beneficiaries.In practice,the main cause of this problem is the path selection of the implementation mechanism of targeted poverty alleviation.The study shows that the main root of the problem lies in the imperfect supervision and assessment mechanism of poverty alleviation.Using the game model of supervision between the upper and lower levels of government,this paper expounds that the lower levels of government prefer the projects with quick results,low risks and less difficulties to highlight their political achievements.The root cause of the problem lies inthe lack of trace management and supervision of the poverty alleviation project path by the higher level government.The risk of beneficiary group deviation can be reduced by establishing a scientific assessment mechanism.Forthly,based on the practical experience of targeted poverty alleviation,this paper summarizes the moral hazard problems arising from the practice of targeted poverty alleviation and analyzes the institutional causes.Based on the information of poverty-stricken households in town B of county A in 2016,this paper summarizes the moral hazard behaviors of poverty-stricken targets in the practice of targeted poverty alleviation,which are mainly manifested as the persistent poverty phenomenon of rural "laches" relying on poverty alleviation,the elderly want to transfer the responsibility of supporting for them to government.The study finds that the moral hazard behavior of the poverty alleviation objects is one of the important reasons for the lack of initiative of the "poor households" to get rid of poverty,and expounds that the main reason for the moral hazard behavior of the poverty alleviation objects is "excessive poverty alleviation".Based on the above analysis,this paper proposes the strategic choice of optimizing the implementation mechanism of targeted poverty alleviation on this issue: Strengthening targeted poverty alleviation and promoting the endogenous driving force of poverty alleviation for poor households.Through the establishment of public welfare posts to stimulate the poor households' willingness to independently shake off poverty.Introducing educational resources to improve the ability of poverty-stricken households to lift themselves out of poverty.The punishment mechanism of "cheating" behavior should be established to take punishment measures against the cheating behavior of poverty alleviation objects and prevent the occurrence of cheating behavior.Finally,based on the above research,the paper summarizes the research conclusions and systematically puts forward Suggestions on the optimization of the implementation mechanism of targeted poverty alleviation.