Study On The Investment Game Of Rural Land Consolidation Projects On PPP Mode

The primary reason for the low efficiency of rural land consolidation projects (RLCP) is that the investor, constructor and the beneficiary is not consistent in China. PPP mode is an ideal mode which can improve the efficiency of RLCP from the institutional level. It has been accepted from the social. Firstly, this paper summed up the theory and practice of RLCP in PPP model according the research from domestic and foreign, and then explored the public goods theory, stakeholder theory and game theory. Besides this paper summed up three kinds of common investment mode, then defined a PPP model which is more commonly used in RLCP in China, and discussed the operating mechanism and game relations of RLCP in PPP model, and then established a cost-benefit function of the investment in RLCP from the angle of economics. Taking leading enterprise of agricultural industrialization and government or rural cooperation (collective) organization as examples, the paper related to the definition of them firstly, and got the game payoff of them based on the analysis of their strategy. Then it selected the indexes of the subsidy of the project from the government and project construction cost and land leased period to establish the game model of them based on the analysis of their game ingredients, and found the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium at last.Through the research of this paper, the following conclusions can be indicated:(1) Three kinds of basic game relationship are existed in RLCP with the application of the PPP mode. They are the game between government and enterprise on the project government subsidy and the project construction cost, and between enterprises and rural cooperation (collective) organization on the project construction cost and farmland leasing period for enterprises, and between enterprise and farmer on amount of labor, wages, transferred to the farmland area and farmland tenancy fee.(2) The benefit of RLCP is a function of the project construction cost and influence coefficients of economic benefit of projects to the social benefit and economic benefit, increasing arable land and the project construction cost. The factors affecting enterprises payment are the project construction cost, the subsidy of the project from the government and land contracting period for enterprises. Factors influencing government payment lies in four aspects, they are new land area, the subsidy of the project from the government, project construction cost and influence coefficients of economic benefit of projects to the social benefit. Four factors impact the rural cooperation (collective) organization, they are new land area, project construction cost, influence coefficients of economic benefit of projects to the economic benefit, and land contracting period for enterprises.(3)In the game between enterprise and government, under the premise of enterprise to accept the project and capital operating efficiency can be guaranteed, the conditions for government identified project government subsidy are:the payoff of higher project construction cost inputs for the business is no less than retention payment; the payoff of lower project construction cost inputs for the business is no more than retention payment. When the project government subsidy is given, the conditions for the enterprises to accept the project are:the payoff of higher project construction cost inputs for the business is no less than retention payment; the condition for the enterprises to choose higher project construction cost is that when business select higher project construction cost inputs, the added value of land management benefits is no less than the increased cost inputs.(4) In the game between enterprise and rural cooperation (collective) organization, in order to make the economic benefit reached the maximum, the condition to choose project construction cost for the enterprise is the difference between marginal revenue and marginal cost of land management in the operation period is the proportion of project economic life time of land leased period for enterprises; land leased period, sensitivity of benefit and cost of project to the construction cost are the main influence factors. The condition to choose land leased period for the rural cooperation (collective) organization is the equilibrium equivalent curve tangents to the demand curve of the project construction cost at the proportion of land leased period in project economic lifetime.(5) The government would have to give higher project government subsidy to the enterprises in order to bring in more social funds to participate in RLCP, and stimulate the enterprises to choose higher project construction cost effectively to reach maximize project benefits; to get the Pareto optimal solution, two parties would have to bargain between the game of enterprise and rural cooperation (collective) organization.