Research On Retailer Dual Channel Supply Chain Pricing And Revenue Coordination

While consumers enjoy the convenience of online goods,they also increase the pressure on traditional offline channels of large retailers such as Wal-Mart and Suning.Retailers have successively tried to open online channels,but they also face the challenges of pricing and revenue coordination of related channels.The research object of this paper is the dual-channel supply chain of risk-averse retailers under the free rider behavior,that is,a two-tier supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer.The impact of circumvention and consumer hitchhiking on supply chain pricing and revenue coordination.First,based on the demand function under the influence of free-riding behavior,a risk-averse retailer dual-channel supply chain pricing model is established.Solve the centralized decision-making model of the retailer's dual-channel supply chain and Stackelberg's decentralized decision-making pricing model respectively,and get the optimal pricing strategy of the retailer's dual-channel supply chain.Secondly,for the channel conflict problem caused by "double marginalization" in the supply chain,a revenue sharing contract is used for coordination,and the effectiveness of the revenue sharing contract coordination is analyzed.Finally,Matlab software is used to analyze and simulate the examples to verify the correctness of the conclusion.The research shows that:(1)Regardless of which decision-making model,the optimal channel price in the online and offline channels of the retailer's dual-channel supply chain is inversely related to the degree of risk aversion of the retailer and the standard deviation of market demand fluctuations,while the manufacturer The wholesale price is proportional.(2)Too high or too low revenue sharing contract coefficient will cause the profits of the supply chain members to be damaged.Only within a certain range of revenue sharing coefficients can the respective profits of the supply chain members achieve Pareto improvement and achieve risk avoidance under free ridership Coordination of the dual-channel supply chain of small retailers.