Plato's moral and political philosophy: Individual and polis in the 'Republic'

Interpretations of the relation between Plato's political and moral philosophy are mired in controversy. What is the polis' good? What is individual happiness? Is the polis' good reducible to individual happiness, or is it something above and beyond? If neither reduces to the other, how should their relation be conceived? If the happiness of individuals is non-reductive, what is happiness and are individuals happy in the ideal polis?;Chapter 1 expounds and criticizes the two main views in the literature: political organicism and individualism. Neither view satisfies the condition of adequacy that an interpretation of Plato's politics must be compatible with the prima facie theses, first, that individual happiness is irreducible to the polis' good and, second, that the polis' good is irreducible to individual happiness. Whereas political organicism reduces individual happiness to the polis' good, individualism reduces the polis' good to individual happiness.;In chapter 2, I develop a view that does satisfy the condition of adequacy: weak organicism, an organic account of the metaphysics and good of the polis, establishes the second thesis while remaining compatible with the first. Conceptual space for the possibility that individual happiness is irreducible is opened through mereological relations implying that individuals as such are not structurally dependent on the whole polis (whereas individuals qua citizens, i.e., individuals instantiating a sortal part or class, are structurally dependent). Weak organicism therefore does not imply that the happiness of individuals as such is reducible to a person's function in the polis.;In chapter 3, I consider the relation between the polis' good and individual happiness within the context of a case study of Socrates' construction of the primitive polis. I shall argue against an individualistic view and determine that the polis' good and individual happiness are coordinate.;Chapter 4 develops a non-reductive interpretation of individual happiness. I argue that a necessary condition of happiness is virtue. Then I argue that all individuals in Plato's ideal polis are capable of virtue. Philosophers have genuine virtue qualified by knowledge. Chapter 5 argues that workers have genuine virtue qualified by true belief.