Swatting at flies: Pakistan's use of counterinsurgency

Since September 11, 2001, the Taliban and al Qaeda have taken up sanctuary in Pakistan's tribal areas that border Afghanistan, and addressing this sanctuary may be the most essential step to defeating them. So far, Islamabad has failed to deny safe haven to militant groups in this region. Two major factors dictate whether Pakistan will eliminate this sanctuary. The first is Islamabad's willingness to combat these insurgent and terrorist groups, and the second is its ability to do so. Examining Pakistan's willingness to fight militant groups is moot, however, if Pakistan is unable to wage counterinsurgency successfully. Therefore, the second major factor --- Pakistan's capacity for conducting a counterinsurgency campaign --- comprises the central question of this paper. This paper seeks to examine the extent to which Pakistan is actually engaging in counterinsurgency best practices and to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses in doing so. Through a case study of the summer 2009 Operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat District and an examination of Pakistani learning since then, this paper analyzes Pakistan's effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations and suggests policies to improve its capabilities in the future.