| Global financial integration does not erode politics; instead, politics still shapes financial markets. This comparative study across three industrial democracies---the United States, Japan, and Germany---reveals the extent to which domestic politics and institutions mediate the global forces of converging financial systems. The cases to be examined include reform processes in financial regulation, supervision and crisis management, stretching from the late 1970s to the early 2000s, occurring in response to the structural changes in financial markets and to the financial crises.;A small-N comparison of reform cases both across countries and over time is undertaken in this work. This thesis examines the impact of political institutions on diverse policy patterns in a variety of political contexts. In order to identify the factors that lead to policy changes, this research introduces the concept of a vested veto player. A vested veto player is a political actor who has entrenched interests in the status quo, and the potential power to veto reform initiatives. A specific focus is placed on the position or power shifts of such actors. Through in-depth comparative analysis, this study analyzes the following factors that led to these shifts: (1) the decrease in economic or political benefits associated with the status quo, (2) the increased political power of policy entrepreneurs, (3) shifts in the political alliances of veto players due to regime change, (4) Loss of public support for vested veto players, and (5) the enhanced functions of regional and global institutions that empower a national government to control or limit vetoes.;My dissertation also examines reform agenda in response to the 2007 subprime mortgage loan crisis. The discussion highlights the increasing role of regional and international institutions in financial supervision, as well as the potential political obstacles embedded in national political structures to supervisory-reform initiatives. |
